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Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action – North Programme (SIFSIA-N)

Final Evaluation Report

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Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| ARC | Agricultural Research Corporation |
| ARP | Agricultural Revival Programme |
| ARSC | Animal Resources Services Company |
| CAPES | Crop Area and Production Estimation System |
| CBS | Central Bureau of Statistics |
| CFSAM | Crop & Food Supply Assessment Mission |
| CLiMIS | Crop and Livestock Market Information System (South Sudan) |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| CRMA | Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis |
| CTA | Chief Technical Adviser |
| EC | European Commission (of the EU) |
| EFSNA | Emergency Food Supply and Nutrition Assessment |
| ERCUC | Emergency & Rehabilitation Coordination Unit |
| ESA | Agricultural Development Economics Division (FAO) |
| ESAF | Food Security and Agricultural Projects Analysis Service (ESA/FAO) |
| EU | European Union |
| EWS | Early Warning System |
| FAO | Food and Agricultural Organisation (of the UN) |
| FAMIS | Food & Agricultural Marketing Information System |
| FEWSNet | Famine Early Warning Systems Network |
| FMO | Framework of Mutual Obligations |
| FNC | Forests National Corporation |
| FSC | Food Security Council |
| FSL | Food Security and Livelihood (cluster) |
| FSNWG | Food Security and Nutrition Working Group |
| FSTC | Food Security Technical Committee |
| FSTS | Food Security Technical Secretariat |
| GAEZ | Global Agro-Ecological Zone |
| GIEWS | Global Information and Early Warning System |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| GoS | Government of the Sudan |
| GoSS | Government of Southern Sudan |
| HAC | Humanitarian Affairs Commission |
| HEA | Household Economy Analysis |
| HIES | Household Income & Expenditure Survey |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| IPC | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification |
| I-PRSP | Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goals |
| MIC | Ministry of International Cooperation |
| MoAF | Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry |
| MoARF | Ministry of Animal Resources & Fisheries |
| MoFNE | Ministry of Finance & National Economy |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MoIWR | Ministry of Irrigation & Water resources |

| | |
|----------|---|
| MoWSS | Ministry of Welfare and Social Security |
| MTE | mid-term evaluation |
| NAO | National Authorising Officer |
| NDVI | Normalised Difference Vegetation Index |
| NIC | National Information Centre |
| NNCU | National Nutrition Coordination Unit (MoH) |
| NRL | Natural Resources Land and Water Division |
| NRM | Natural Resource Management |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| OECD-DAC | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee |
| PBEE | Evaluation Service (FAO) |
| PET | pictorial evaluation tool |
| PSU | Programme Support Unit |
| RFE | Rainfall Estimate Method |
| SAMIS | Sudan Agro-Meteorological Information |
| ROSS | Republic of South Sudan |
| RSA | Remote Sensing Authority |
| SAMIS | Sudan Agro-Meteorological Information System |
| SBHS | Sudan Baseline Household Survey |
| SC | Steering Committee |
| SIFSIA | Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action |
| SMA | Sudan Meteorological Authority |
| SPCRP | Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme |
| SPSS | Statistical Package for Social Sciences |
| SRCo | Strategic Reserve Corporation |
| TCE | Emergency Operations & Rehabilitation Division (FAO) |
| TCES | Special Emergency Programmes Service (TCE/FAO) |
| TOKTEN | Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UN | United Nations |
| VAM | Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (WFP) |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organisation |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

Executive Summary

ES1. The SIFSIA programme is one of the first of its kind in attempting to build government capacity in terms of food security information and analysis *and* strengthening food security policy-making, in a ‘post-conflict’ and challenging environment. This final evaluation of SIFSIA-North aims to capture the learning from the SIFSIA experience to inform future projects of this kind in Sudan and elsewhere, as well as to review the overall performance of the programme. It focuses on the second phase of the programme following the mid-term evaluation, from January/February 2009 to October/November 2011.

ES2. The defining event, politically and economically since 2009, has been the secession of South Sudan in July 2011. Although the SIFSIA programme began during a period of unprecedented economic growth in Sudan, it is ending in an era of deteriorating economic conditions. Poverty and food insecurity have persisted throughout, but policy priorities have been dominated by concerns of macro-economic stabilisation. The rapidly evolving political context and completion of the CPA has also absorbed much government attention in recent years. This has been a challenging environment in which to implement a capacity-building programme targeted at federal government with improved food security policy-making at its heart. With hindsight, SIFSIA was an extremely ambitious programme in the context of Sudan and it was simply not possible to achieve all that it set out to do in the time available and with the resources available.

ES3. After a slow start to the first phase of SIFSIA-N, momentum has substantially picked up during the second phase of the programme and overall performance has been good. The PSU has benefited from strong management and a high-performing team of national staff has been established. A major achievement was the facilitated establishment of the FSTS, a critical first step in establishing the institutional set-up envisaged for improved food security analysis and policy-making. But a major set-back has been the continued failure to establish the FSC, the highest level inter-ministerial decision-making body. Although both FAO and the EU in Khartoum could have done more to lobby for the FSC, this has ultimately been beyond the control of the SIFSIA programme. A narrow window of opportunity now exists to establish the FSC before the programme finishes at the end of April 2012.

ES4. The technical food security information side of SIFSIA-N’s work has been particularly strong. Notable achievements include:

- improved rainfall monitoring using TAMSAT and more recently FAO-RFE
- establishment of the Food and Agricultural Market Information System
- updated land cover maps
- establishment of a web-based nutrition information monitoring system
- supporting the SBHS and adding a food security component which has provided valuable baseline data on food consumption patterns
- introduction of the IPC at federal and state levels as a popular and widely-used analytical tool that has encouraged cross-sectoral and cross-ministry coordination.

ES5. All of these have helped to fill a data vacuum on food security by contributing to the availability of more reliable and updated data and analysis. Close to the end of the SIFSIA-N programme, some of these initiatives are still being rolled out and/ or finalised, for example the web-based nutrition information system and FAMIS; this is partly a consequence of early

delays in programme implementation. Some components will need follow-up financial and technical support to fulfil their potential, for example the IPC by strengthening the availability and reliability of data collected at state and locality levels. There has also been very little gender disaggregation of data nor gendered analysis, an issue that requires attention and follow-up support.

ES6. Overall, SIFSIA-N has made substantial progress in bringing together different line ministries to carry out multi-sectoral food security analysis in a culture where there has traditionally been little collaboration. However, it would take substantially longer than the duration of this programme to establish a fully integrated food security information system in the context of Sudan. Located within MoAF, agriculture and crop production have been a key focus of the SIFSIA-N programme; other sectors such as livestock have been less well-covered. In the absence of the FSC SIFSIA-N has struggled to shed the perception that it is a 'Ministry of Agriculture' programme. The programme's ability to address emergency/humanitarian food security issues has also been challenging, partly because of issues of access and partly because much of this has been conflict-related which brings its own sensitivities. Nevertheless, SIFSIA-N rightly prides itself on being one of the few sources of food security analysis across the country.

ES7. The food security policy side of SIFSIA-N's work has been weaker. National consultants have been brought in to carry out a number of policy-related studies and research and these make a valuable contribution. However, lack of capacity-building support means that the research and reports have suffered from a lack of peer review and recommendations are often generic or unclear. The major learning from this experience is that policy-related work requires a very different skill-set to technical food security information collection and analysis, must be informed by a strong understanding of the political economy of policy-making, and must be supported by investment in dissemination and fostering policy-level debate.

ES8. Despite the challenging context in which the SIFSIA-N programme has been implemented, the record of how its materials have been used is quite impressive. SIFSIA's work has been particularly relevant to the information needs of MoAF with its focus on crop production and agro-meteorological monitoring. There appears to have been a high level of utilization at senior levels of government of SIFSIA's seasonal updates and data on food prices during the 2011 agricultural season. The SBHS and the food security component that was part of it have been essential sources of information for the I-PRSP. In short, SIFSIA-N has made a significant contribution at a time when reliable data were scarce and has been welcomed by many civil servants in making the case for developing an evidence-base to inform decision-making.

ES9. There is concern about the Government of Sudan's ability to sustain the work that SIFSIA-N has begun. Two ingredients are essential: political commitment and financial resources. The establishment of the FSC before the SIFSIA programme ends in April 2012 would be the strongest indication of political commitment on the part of GoS. The availability of financial resources, especially to cover the operating costs of different components of the system, is concerning in an era in which less resources will be available. Some elements of SIFSIA's capacity-building efforts are well-embedded within government institutions, for example agro-meteorological, remote sensing and GIS skills within the SMA and RSA. Other elements are more vulnerable and will require continued investment of international resources and technical support, for example continued roll-out and

strengthening of the IPC, the continuation of FAMIS, and support to the nutrition information system.

ES10. The evaluation makes three sets of recommendations, (i) for the final months of the SIFSIA-N programme; (ii) in order to sustain the benefits of SIFSIA-N in the longer term; and (iii) for the new food security project that will commence in 2012, targeted at state level.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background to SIFSIA

1. The SIFSIA programme – the Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action – commenced in December 2006. It is essentially a capacity-building programme to support government in building food security and market information systems, and in strengthening policy and planning initiatives to contribute to improved food security¹. Thus, as the programme name suggests, SIFSIA is about more than technical food security information systems; it has been specifically designed to inform and influence government decision-making and food security policies. The intended outcomes of the SIFSIA programme are:

- an overall policy framework for food security defined and operational;
- an institutional set-up for food security established and functioning to enhance coordination and to strengthen vertical and horizontal linkages;
- effective policies and programmes designed, monitored, evaluated and updated for:
 - (i) rehabilitation and strengthening smallholders' livelihoods; (ii) managing natural resources in a sustainable and equitable manner; (iii) protecting the vulnerable; and (iv) monitoring relevant Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) indicators;
- relevant food security information easily accessed and used by all relevant stakeholders.

2. Following the 'one country, two systems' principle in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005, SIFSIA was divided into two sub-programmes at the outset, one focussed on capacity-building of the federal Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum in the north – SIFSIA-North (SIFSIA-N) – and one focussed on capacity-building of the new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in Juba in the south – SIFSIA-South (SIFSIA-S), although with similar objectives. This division was reinforced by secession of the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS) in July 2011. This report covers the final evaluation of SIFSIA-N; a separate report has been written evaluating SIFSIA-S.

3. Supported by Stabex funding, SIFSIA is intended to contribute to the European Commission's (EC's) overall development objective in the Sudan of *consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development*². The Stabex funding amounts to EUR 20 million, equally divided between North and South. The total project budget was supposed to be EUR 20.6 million, to include substantial contributions from the GNU in Khartoum and GoSS in Juba although these were not forthcoming³. The revised end date of the SIFSIA-N project is 30 April 2012. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) was contracted both with programme formulation and with full implementation of the SIFSIA programme.

4. A mid-term evaluation (MTE) of the SIFSIA programme was carried out in January 2009, drawing lessons from the experience of the first phase of the programme and making

¹ As stated in the Project design document.

² SIFSIA is also seen as relevant to the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG 1), to reduce poverty and hunger.

³ 3% of total funding was expected to come from the Italian government, but this was not realised. FAO filled this financial gap from its own resources.

recommendations for the second phase. This final evaluation focuses on the second phase – the period since the MTE, from January/February 2009 to October/November 2011.

1.2 *Final Evaluation and Methodology*

5. According to the Terms of Reference (TOR), the overall purpose of this final evaluation of the SIFSIA programme is to review project delivery of the expected outputs and provide decision makers in the respective governments (in Khartoum and in Juba), and the EC with sufficient information to make an informed judgment about the performance of the project (its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact), and to make decisions about future related interventions and the future of food security information in North and South Sudan, acknowledging the recent division into two separate States. See Annex 1 for the full ToR.

6. In the initial round of interviews with the key stakeholders, however, it became apparent to the evaluation team that learning should be the main purpose of the evaluation, particularly in terms of learning from the SIFSIA experience that can feed into and inform the new food security policy and capacity-building programmes to be implemented in the Sudan and South Sudan, commencing in early 2012 (and possibly wider learning that is relevant to other food security projects planned and implemented in the Sudan in the future). Stakeholders in-country also requested that the evaluation provides guidance to the SIFSIA programme in its last few months in both the Sudan and South Sudan, and for the respective exit strategies. And there is interest in the generic learning from the SIFSIA experience. The programme is regarded by many as the first of its kind in attempting to build capacity in terms of food security information and analysis *and* strengthening food security policy-making, in a ‘post-conflict’ and challenging environment. What can be learned from this experience in order to inform future projects of this kind?

7. The evaluation team developed an evaluation matrix to guide the line of enquiry for this exercise. The evaluation matrix is a rationalisation and to some extent re-arranging of the many questions and issues listed in the ToR, organised according to the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, and indicating the main sources drawn upon in order to answer each of these evaluation questions. See Annex 2. This final evaluation has particularly focused on the issue of utilisation of food security information and policy analyses produced and supported by the SIFSIA project, regarded as critical to the effectiveness of the project. It has also focused on the prospects for sustaining the capacity that the SIFSIA project has built within government when the project officially ends.

8. The evaluation team focused most of its efforts at the federal level in Khartoum, reflecting the federal focus of the SIFSIA programme. Meetings and interviews were held with SIFSIA programme participants, other institutions concerned with food security in the Sudan, and actual and potential users of SIFSIA information & analysis. Two state visits were carried out, to Kassala State and to Gedaref State. In addition, the SIFSIA focal points in all states were contacted and given the opportunity to feedback their perspectives on the SIFSIA programme. See Annexes 3 and 4 for an itinerary and list of people met. A debriefing of stakeholders was conducted in Khartoum on 24 November 2011 and a debriefing to FAO Rome was organised for 19 December 2011.

2 Institutional and policy context for SIFSIA-North

2.1 *The overall context – the impact of secession and the changing policy context*

9. The defining event, politically and economically since 2009, has been the secession of South Sudan in July 2011. This marks the end of the period governed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and therefore of the Interim National Constitution that was part of that agreement and creates a vacuum in which a new constitution must be drafted. Secession of South Sudan also has major economic consequences for the Sudan. With approximately 75 percent of known oil reserves in South Sudan, the loss of revenue to Khartoum is severe. At the time of writing there is still no agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Government of South Sudan on key economic issues post-secession such as transit fees for oil from South Sudan that is piped to Port Sudan for export, nor the division of government debt.

10. Key milestones in the CPA, including elections in 2010, the referendum on independence in South Sudan in January 2011 and the eventual secession of South Sudan have absorbed much government attention in the last three years. This has tended to intensify the changing and unstable policy environment in Khartoum commented upon in the SIFSIA mid-term evaluation.

11. The abrupt drop in oil revenues and therefore in foreign exchange since July 2011 is associated with rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in the Sudan (see section 2.2 below). It has also triggered renewed government interest in the role that agriculture and livestock can play in the Sudan's economic future. The high-profile Agricultural Revival Programme (ARP) was launched in 2008 and has been run more or less independently of the Ministry of Agriculture with the intention of transforming agriculture into a modern sector, achieving national self-sufficiency in wheat production by 2011 (Council of Ministers, 2008). However, recent reports indicate that the ARP has not achieved its objectives and Sudan still has a substantial deficit in wheat. The macro-economic incentives to replace the lost foreign exchange from oil by increasing agricultural production in order to reduce food imports and eventually to export cereals, as well as to increase livestock exports, are strong. In terms of policy priorities it is these economic stabilisation concerns that dominate, and issues of access to food and poverty have not been given the same emphasis. Amongst policy-makers and government officials in the Sudan food security has long been equated with food self-sufficiency, and there is little sign that this is changing. But there is evidence of the close monitoring of food prices at high levels in government circles, for example in the weekly economic sector ministerial committee meeting chaired by the President, reflecting concerns about deteriorating economic conditions.

12. After long delays⁴ an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) has now been drafted for the Sudan, post-secession, 'to begin to elaborate a vision and new direction for its governance, socio-economic development and poverty reduction efforts' (GoS, 2011) 3). This has been shared for comment with international partners. There has long been a strained relationship between GoS and the international aid community in the Sudan,

⁴ An interim PRSP was prepared in 2004, but was regarded as '(falling) short of providing a credible profile of poverty, the depth of poverty and its various dimensions due to an acute lack of data' (GoS, 2011: 9)

characterised by deep distrust on either side; the I-PRSP could represent an opportunity for greater collaboration and dialogue between government and international agencies around poverty and development issues, through what is anticipated to be a difficult period of transition for the new Sudan.

13. More worryingly, the Rural Development, Food Security and Poverty Alleviation Act, drafted by government in 2005, with a section specifically on food security, has still not been enacted and is a major stumbling block to the establishment of the Food Security Council (FSC), part of the institutional set-up for food security proposed by the SIFSIA project – see section Output 1 of Section 4.2 below.

2.2 *Triggers of food insecurity since 2009*

14. The Sudan enjoyed unprecedented growth in the last decade – GDP grew by almost 8 percent per year between 2000 and 2009, one of the highest growth rates in Africa, fuelled by oil – yet chronic food insecurity continues to be a reality for many population groups, closely related to the incidence of poverty. The Interim PRSP (GoS, 2011) reports that 46.5 percent of the Sudan's population is below the poverty line. This average figure hides a wide variation, for example in North Darfur state 69 percent are below the poverty line. Poverty and food insecurity are particularly acute amongst the rural population, including those dependent on marginal rain-fed agriculture and/or with little or no livestock, but is now a rising phenomenon amongst the urban poor (Pantuliano et al, 2011).

15. The main triggers of food insecurity since 2009 are:

- at the macro-economic level the loss of oil revenue has had a major impact, and is associated with a package of economic austerity measures that are estimated to have caused prices of food and non-food items to rise by 30 to 50 percent (FEWSNet, 2011a). Subsidies on fuel and sugar were partially removed. Inflation is now running at close to 20 percent;⁵
- violent conflict in parts of the country continues to be a source of acute food insecurity associated with high levels of displacement and humanitarian crisis. There has been protracted conflict in the Darfur region since 2003 and more recent outbreaks of conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states
- recurrent drought has long been a trigger of acute food insecurity. It particularly affects small-scale farmers dependent on rain-fed production and pastoralists dependent on rain-fed pasture, but also the wider population through rising food prices
- regional and global triggers, especially rising global food prices, but also the knock-on effect of drought and food insecurity in the Sudan's neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa.
- At the time of this final evaluation there has been a convergence of all of the above factors, with worrying consequences for food security in 2011/12. FEWSNet (2011b)

⁵ Source, Central Bureau of Statistics

estimates that 3.2 million people are food insecure in the Sudan in November 2011, and this number is likely to increase into 2012.

3 How SIFSIA has accommodated the MTE

3.1 Response to the MTE Recommendations

Table 1. MTE recommendations, FAO management response and evaluation team comments

| MTE Recommendations ⁶ | FAO Management Response | Comments by the Final Evaluation ⁷ |
|--|--|--|
| Timeframe | | |
| 1. Period for phase two be extended from two to four years | Extension until end of 2012 may not be feasible without extra funding. One-year no cost extension submitted to end 2011 | It was subsequently possible to have a second no cost extension to end April 2012 |
| Direction for Phase Two | | |
| 2. Greater emphasis on capacity-building at state level, with some capacity-building extended to all states and in-depth capacity-building focused on six of the most food insecure states | Constrained by resources and rejected focus on a few states, but regional trainings to be continued to support states in food security information systems | Overall federal focus of the project did not change. State-level training did continue, mainly through workshops but limited resources meant little scope for follow-up by the SIFSIA PSU – see section 5.1 |
| 3. Greater emphasis on food security policy analysis with strategic selection of two to three policy issues, each of which to be supported by a clear strategy through to engagement with key decision-makers. Widen policy debate to include other stakeholders | Increased opportunities anticipated with establishment of FSTS and gathering momentum of SIFSIA implementation. PSU to have an additional expert working on policy | This has continued to be the weakest component of the SIFSIA-N project. Increased output in terms of policy papers and briefs, but limited investment in dissemination and limited support from FAO HQ – see section 4.2, Output 2 |
| 5. Over-emphasis on crop production to be re-balanced with more attention paid to other | Recommendation rejected with claim that PSU is providing balanced support to the different | Despite the project's efforts to be multi-sectoral and multi-institutional, it has continued to be more |

⁶ The numbering of recommendations reflects the numbering in the original FAO Management Response – hence jumping from recommendation 3 to 5

⁷ Also drawing on the follow-up reporting by SIFSIA-North in November 2010

| | | |
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| sectors and livelihood groups eg livestock and pastoralists, issues of poverty and vulnerability | line ministries which contribute to food security information systems. A focus on urban populations would overstretch the project | oriented towards crop production with weaker coverage of some other key aspects of food security – see section 5.4 |
| 6. SIFSIA-N to pay greater attention to emergency food security issues, connecting with the monitoring and analysis ongoing in Darfur and giving more support to the Three Areas | With the establishment of the FSTS a greater focus on vulnerability analysis anticipated and involvement of Darfur in IPC expected to improve coverage | Coverage of emergency food security issues mainly through the IPC, and overall rather weak, although SIFSIA-N rightly claims to be the only source of food security analysis that is nationwide – see section 5.5 |
| Institutional set-up | | |
| 7. Managing the process of establishing the FSTS and FSTC by hiring a senior national consultant and ensuring clear ToR, thus paving the way for establishing the FSC and reiterating a holistic approach to food security | Lack of commitment from government seen as a challenge. Two national consultants hired to work with the PSU | Despite the challenging context, the PSU invested well in the establishment phase of the FSTS with the support of senior national consultants. External obstacles to establishing the FSC persisted – see section 4.2, Output 1 |
| 8. The role of the SC to be reviewed, ToR drawn up, and the chair to rotate to ensure maximum participation and ownership of all participating ministries | Establishment of the FSTS awaited | The PSU promoted the idea of a rotating chair for the SC but it was beyond their control and was not supported |
| 9. Quarterly tripartite meetings to be held between the SIFSIA/SPCRP SC chairs, FAO and EC | After the MTE these started to occur on a monthly basis | The momentum behind the tripartite meetings dissipated, and a valuable opportunity to build collaboration at this senior level, especially to mobilize high level political support, was lost |
| Sharpening SIFSIA-N's focus, planning and reporting | | |
| 10. Develop a food security conceptual framework, drawing on a livelihoods model, in close collaboration with SIFSIA-S | The project was pursuing the standard FAO food security framework. The value of spelling this out acknowledged | The PSU went further, by adapting the FSAU food security analysis framework, subsequently used in SIFSIA training and capacity-building. (Little evidence of collaboration |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | | with SIFSIA-S on this) |
| 11. To have maximum impact, SIFSIA-N to focus on core activities | SIFSIA-N already focused on core activities through the logframe revision ie 8 outputs. Other MTE recommendations seen to contradict this | SIFSIA-N has been much more focused and effective in phase 2. Without additional resources it would have been hard for SIFSIA-N to take on all recommendations from MTE re expanded coverage |
| 12. Capacity-building to be linked to core activities, focused more on state level, and strategically planned and implemented | The focus on a few states rejected, but acceptance that training provision strategy could be improved | Capacity-building and training has been more strategically directed, although resources are generally inadequate for follow-up and mentoring on the job. Complementarity with SPCR not realised |
| 13. SIFSIA's Research Fund should be more strategic, oriented to key policy areas | Remaining Research Fund resources to be used as indicated in the MTE | The Research Fund has been used more strategically in phase 2 – see section 4.2, Output 2 |
| 14. A clear strategy for phase 2, and a revised log-frame recommended. Incorporate cross-cutting themes of gender & environment | Revising the log-frame, which had buy in from a wide range of stakeholders, rejected. The strategy issue addressed through a budget revision process | The budget revision did reflect some recommendations from the MTE. Although the log-frame was tightened, failure to adjust it perpetuated some biases in the project – see section 5. Also a failure to address gender |
| Project management | | |
| 15. Re-align capacity of PSU with more emphasis on short-term strategic consultancies and less dependency on long-term international staff | Qualified national consultants to fill the gap | Departing international staff from PSU effectively replaced with strong national staff, and good use made of short-term consultancies |
| 16. Urgent clarification of leadership & management of PSU, and improved management procedures | The necessary recruitment procedures put in place | This was finally and effectively resolved in Sept 2009, with a clear improvement in management procedures, resulting in a highly effective PSU since |
| 17. SIFSIA-N and GNU to establish joint & transparent financial management systems, with clear GNU funding | In the hand of government. Director of FSTS will have a key role to play | Limited progress due to government reluctance to adopt this recommendation |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| commitments | | |
| 18. MTE team member to brief SC on MTE findings and to facilitate an implementation plan to roll-out recommendations | Prepared to commit resources if required | Ultimately, the SIFSIA-N team did not feel this was necessary. Use of short-term national consultants immediately after the MTE appeared to fill the gap |

3.2 Overall comments on the impact of the MTE

16. Following the MTE there were two significant changes that positively impacted on the performance and effectiveness of the SIFSIA programme. First, the facilitated establishment of the Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) accelerated implementation of the programme and was a critical first step in establishing the institutional set-up envisaged for improved food security analysis and policy-making at federal level. Second, clarifying the management and leadership of the SIFSIA-N Programme Support Unit (PSU) by confirming the acting Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) in the role was key to resolving many of the personnel and performance challenges that the PSU faced in phase 1, and has contributed to much improved performance and focus of the programme in phase 2.

17. In terms of the orientation of the SIFSIA programme, the impact of the MTE is harder to spot. Although the budget revision of January 2010 re-allocated resources to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), and to vulnerability analysis in response to the MTE, the programme has continued to engage most with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MoAF) and to focus more on crop production with weaker coverage of the livestock sector. Coverage of emergency/acute food insecurity is also limited, mainly addressed through the IPC. This may have been reinforced by FAO's decision to retain the revised log-frame, which encouraged implementation and reporting against a set of activities agreed in 2008 before the MTE. Although the PSU was reluctant to embark on another log-frame revision after the MTE, some adaptation of the log-frame to reflect a more balanced multi-sectoral approach should have been possible through discussion with the Steering Committee. This did not need to be a lengthy process, for example to amend output 4 focused on crop monitoring and forecasting to incorporate livestock as well. The programme's federal focus was also retained with limited re-allocation of funds to increase activity at state level, in contrast to the re-orientation that happened in South Sudan where the budget re-allocation was used to release more resources to state level. Without an increase in overall resources there were good reasons for maintaining the programme's federal focus rather than spreading resources too thinly – see section 5.1 – and the evaluation concludes that this was more of a design issue.

4 Implementation of SIFSIA: effectiveness and efficiency

4.1 Introduction

18. This section reviews the effectiveness of the SIFSIA-N programme in delivering its outputs/outcomes, and also efficiency in terms of the use of resources and timeliness of the provision of inputs and decision-making. It reviews performance of the SIFSIA-N programme against each of the eight outputs in the revised log-frame, as this has been the

planning and management tool guiding implementation and reporting since it was drawn up and finalised in 2008. It comments on the gender sensitivity of SIFSIA's work, key to the programme's effectiveness, provides a financial analysis and ends by summarising the evaluation's overall findings in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme.

4.2 Evaluation of results

4.2.1 Output 1: Effective cross-sector partnerships for food security – institutional set-up

19. In terms of the institutional set-up, the main achievement during the second phase of the SIFSIA programme has been the establishment of the FSTS, following a ministerial decree in February 2009, although this was badly delayed in relation to the programme's life-cycle. The main setback has been the continued failure to establish the FSC, the highest level inter-ministerial decision-making body envisaged in the institutional set-up, to be chaired by the Vice-President. As mentioned in section 2.2, this requires ratification of the Rural Development, Food Security and Poverty Alleviation Act, to be followed by a Presidential decree establishing the FSC. Failure to achieve this, five years into the SIFSIA programme, is an indication of a lack of political will during this period to address some of the Sudan's fundamental food security issues. The PSU has worked tirelessly to promote the FSC, as have the FSTS and some members of the SC, but so far to little avail. Another constraining factor has been high turnover at ministerial level: there have been three Ministers of Agriculture during the life-time of SIFSIA, each with slightly different priorities and interests, so there has been little consistent support for the FSC. It is unfortunate that the tripartite meetings between FAO, the EU Delegation and the chair of the SIFSIA SC did not continue as these could have been used to develop a strategy to promote establishment of the FSC. As became apparent during the MTE, movement on this issue will require high level political backing beyond the usual institutional channels. Support of senior officials and advisers within the ARP is essential. Meetings with the ARP and members of parliament during this final evaluation indicate that there may be a window of opportunity in the last few months of the SIFSIA programme to establish the FSC, related to growing concerns about deteriorating food insecurity conditions in the Sudan in 2012.

20. The FSTS now has a staff of 20, 12 of whom are technical. It is organised into 3 units: the Food Security Planning and Policy Unit, the Food Security Analysis Unit and the Food Security Programmes and Interventions Unit. With the support of senior national consultants, the PSU put substantial effort into recruiting an effective FSTS team. The numbers are on the heavy-side for an analytical inter-ministerial body of this nature and its full potential has not yet been realised. Importantly, its members are drawn from 6 different federal ministries; the achievement in creating an inter-ministerial unit in an institutional culture that is not conducive to collaboration across line ministries should not be underestimated. But 8 of the 12 technical FSTS staff are from MoAF which fuels the perception that it is an 'MoAF-owned' body, discouraging equal engagement from all ministries. Indeed, some ministries that are key to food security have not yet taken up their positions in the FSTS, most notably the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS) and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE). Since they were recruited in early 2010, FSTS staff have been the focus of intensive capacity-building and support by the PSU. The team now produces a number of food security documents more or less independently, including the IPC update, the food security updates, and the seasonal monitors. However, the delayed establishment of the FSTS means that substantial capacity-building is still required for the

Secretariat to reach its full potential, to be able to engage in, and inform policy-level discussions, and to be widely recognised outside the MoAF. It is still strongly associated with SIFSIA and must eventually establish an identity beyond SIFSIA.

21. The 2009 ministerial decree that established the FSTS also established the Food Security Technical Committee (FSTC), supposed to comprise membership at the Under-Secretary and Director-General level across key line ministries, with a mandate that includes overseeing much of the food security information and analysis work, ensuring financial and technical support, and assisting state governments and localities in establishing food security coordination mechanisms. However, this body has never met and attempts by the PSU to set up an independent committee of senior food security experts to advise the programme were rejected by the SC. The consequence of these failed efforts has been a lack of input and guidance in-country to the SIFSIA programme, and to the PSU in particular, on technical and substantive issues. As mentioned in section 9.2, the SC has not been able to fill this gap.

22. In January 2011 a Food Security & Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG) and its sub-working groups were established through ministerial decree. Led by government, this group is intended to bring together multiple stakeholders: government, donors, UN agencies, private sector actors and civil society. Its terms of reference are broad, ranging from sharing and coordination of food security information and analysis, to capacity-building, to decision-making on food security interventions. Its significance is in bringing government and other actors together, including the international community and thus helping to bridge that divide. Its first and only meeting so far was in May 2011. Since then the terms of reference for the three sub-working groups have been discussed: (1) for agriculture, animal resources and irrigation, (2) for health and humanitarian aid, and (3) for trade and markets. However, progress in making this potentially important forum active has been slow during 2011. It has lost momentum and visibility with the international community and has been preoccupied with discussions about the ToR for the sub-working groups. The FSNWG must be given renewed energy and focus to ensure its potential is realised.

23. At state level, despite a federal directive to establish food security committees, progress has been extremely limited due to lack of resources (financial and human) to follow up. In some states a committee may have been formed, but rarely meets (e.g. Kassala State). In other states (e.g. Gedaref) it has not yet been created.

24. The overall picture is of a fragmented and incomplete institutional set-up for food security at federal level, with serious gaps which threaten the whole structure, namely the absence of the high-level FSC.

25.

4.2.2 Output 2: Strengthened capacity for food security policy and interventions

26. The main achievement under this output has been the regular production of bulletins and updates relating to food security. As mentioned in section 6.4 below, there is evidence of some of these feeding into high level discussions at the Council of Minister level, for example in order to monitor the progress of the agricultural season, and to monitor trends in food prices. While this relates more to day-to-day decision-making and management of the economy, it is nevertheless an opportunity to ensure that high-level decisions are informed by evidence and analysis.

27. In terms of conducting more in-depth policy-related analysis and feeding into debates and decision-making on particular policy issues, SIFSIA's record is mixed. After the MTE the PSU changed its approach to be more strategic in the choice of policy issues it has engaged with, and in contracting national consultants to carry out most of the policy analysis and research. It has produced policy documents (either full reports, shorter policy briefs, or both) on a range of topics from national level issues such as rising food prices and poverty, to geographically specific analyses of food security, for example in White Nile State, to topics that have been specifically requested, for example on cereal availability and on warehousing for the Strategic Reserve Corporation (SRCo). A study recently commissioned on *Zakat*⁸ and its role in food security is currently underway.

28. These policy initiatives appear to have been most effective where they have been demand-driven and carried out in close collaboration with the key stakeholder organisation, for example the warehousing and cereal availability studies carried out in collaboration with SRCo. The selection of other topics has apparently come out of ongoing discussions with line ministries at federal level. There is a risk that this can reinforce existing biases within government (for example its focus on cereals) rather than drawing attention to policy issues that have been neglected but that are key to food security, for example livestock and pastoralism. One of the major factors affecting food security in the Sudan in 2011/2012 – the secession of South Sudan – has been given rather limited attention by SIFSIA in its policy-related analysis although a study on the impact of secession is currently underway. So far one of the few pieces of work that looks at the impact of secession in any detail is a FEWSNet one, in which FSTS participated, on the impact of secession on the market and trade flows.

29. Overall, strengthening capacity for food security policy has been one of the weakest components of the SIFSIA-N project. Despite these various outputs, there is little evidence that the *capacity* for food security policy has been strengthened, for a number of reasons.

30. The skill-set of the PSU staff has been technically-oriented, well-equipped to develop the food security information side of the programme, but the skill-sets required to build policy capacity, which are very different, have not been present and it has not been possible to provide these skills adequately by contracting consultants.

31. In this case it would have been reasonable to expect FAO HQ to provide the support needed to fulfil SIFSIA's policy objectives, but this has been very limited, for example inputting into the design and methodology of policy-related research, but with little input into the final policy analysis nor how to influence and engage with the policy-making process.

32. As a result, national consultants commissioned to carry out policy-related research have had little capacity-building support, for example their documents have not been adequately peer reviewed which would have improved their quality, and policy recommendations tend to be general and/or unclear.

33. Opportunities to translate food security information into policy options, for example through scenario developments, have been missed.

⁸ Alms-giving as one of the five pillars of Islam

34. In terms of influencing and informing food security policy, the full potential of the documents that have been prepared has not been realised. There has been little investment in dissemination or in fostering policy dialogue, and no communication strategy to support such activities. The SIFSIA programme has relied heavily on electronic dissemination which is rarely effective in reaching and informing key decision-makers. There may have been a one-off workshop when one of the policy-related documents has been finalised, but this is rarely enough to ensure that the research findings and policy recommendations are widely known, debated and acted upon. Only a few of the documents have been translated into Arabic which further limits their impact.

35. Thus, the PSU and SIFSIA Programme have not provided a strong model on informing policy-making for the FSTS to follow. The FSTS has produced a document on 'Comprehensive National Food Security Policies' in the Sudan. This is a useful starting point in providing an inventory of government policies that relate to food security, but the capacity needed to carry out the quality of research and analysis that can inform food security policy-making and the skills needed to engage with policy-makers and with decision-making processes and debates are not yet established. Indeed, in the absence of the Food Security Council there is little demand for this kind of policy analysis and input.

36. The PSU and FSTS have recently resuscitated the National Food Security Action Plan (NFSAP) for the Sudan, originally prepared in 2007 with FAO support. The FSTS has formed a group to review the document, with the support of a national consultant. Although much updating of the document may be needed, this is a timely initiative at a moment when government is more focused on food security issues. It could provide a useful entry point for discussions between government and international organisations.

4.2.3 Output 3: Strengthened capacity in undertaking food security analysis

37. SIFSIA has carried out extensive food security training at federal and state levels, reaching hundreds of participants. This has helped to raise awareness of the basics of food security, an important contribution in a context in which food security has long been equated with food self-sufficiency. Training in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification System (IPC), which began in 2008, has been widely welcomed and has become a popular tool of analysis within government. The IPC has effectively broken down some of the familiar barriers in the Sudan in terms of line ministries working in isolation of each other and weak data and information flows between federal and state levels. It has become an effective mechanism for encouraging and facilitating cross-sectoral and cross-ministry coordination, as well as a method for feeding up from locality to state to federal levels, making the point that food security means more than crop production. It provides a comparative index of the current food security situation as well as an early warning element, and is an effective communication tool that raises the visibility and awareness of food security issues. In short, it has great value as an analytical tool and an important start has been made. But there are serious and valid concerns about the availability and quality of data that is feeding into the IPC that now need to be addressed, especially as there has been little investment in food security data collection at state or locality levels so far. In the absence of full datasets, the IPC is an inherently subjective process building on 'expert assessment'. Although the templates include an assessment of data confidence and the narrative interpretation should present the limitations of the analysis, often the colourful IPC maps are presented in isolation and these qualifications are lost. Concern about data quality has

affected perceptions of the IPC and its take-up by the international community. At federal level an IPC sub-working group has been created under the FSNWG to review data quality. Addressing this issue, and subsequently investing in improved data availability and quality from locality and state levels will be critical to develop the full potential of the IPC and to ensure it does not lose credibility. Plans are in place for further training to support uptake of the updated IPC version 2. Language issues are also a constraint affecting both data collection and integration.

38. Livelihoods zoning has been planned in the Sudan as a collaborative effort involving SIFSIA since 2009 when the MTE was carried out. This was seen as a pre-requisite for taking forward the Household Economy Approach (HEA). This has finally been carried out by FEWSNet with SIFSIA support⁹. A consensus-based assessment meeting was held in Khartoum in May 2011 to develop livelihood zones delineated according to common characteristics in agro-ecological systems, livelihoods and market conditions, paying attention to vulnerability related to climate and rainfall. This can be a valuable input for the IPC analysis, providing a framework that relates to livelihoods and therefore more closely to food security than a framework organized by administrative boundaries (state and locality). The livelihood zoning has largely been based on subjective assessments so far, and must therefore be a dynamic process constantly refined for accuracy. Other caveats include the fact that it omits urban livelihoods, including the Sudan's large population of internally displaced people (IDPs) and does not capture diverse livelihoods within any one zone. There is scope to improve the livelihood zoning by introducing a geo-referenced approach to zoning, and using the land cover data to refine zone boundaries; this will require substantial investment that is beyond SIFSIA's resources.

39. At the time of the MTE the GIEWS Workstation was envisaged as a multifunctional tool for data processing, presentation and reporting, that could facilitate the sharing of information across line ministries. This objective has not been realized despite training and installation within line ministries and FSTS. Technical, IT and financial barriers have prevented take up of the system¹⁰. Even within the PSU where a server is being established it is not being used effectively; frequent changes to the application and requirements for reinstallation have fuelled reservations about the ability of the system to meet its intended objectives. Current use of the GIEWS Workstation is restricted to MoAF and even here it is not fully functional with limited server accessibility via Rome. There are no examples of the outputs of the system having been achieved. This failure has been an unfortunate waste of resources carrying a high opportunity cost. There is now no functioning system bringing together information from different sectors (although implementation of the FSTS website may partially fill this gap, and GeoNetwork which had been proposed during the project formulation stage was shelved in favour of the GIEWS Workstation which has failed to deliver.

⁹ Livelihoods Zoning 'plus' activity in Sudan A special report by the Famine Early Warning Network (FEWSET) August 2011

¹⁰ The requirement of a fast internet connection and nodes within each office costing in the region of 10k-15k USD per node/year means that this was a less viable or supportable application than originally anticipated

4.2.4 Output 4: Integrated Crop Monitoring, Forecasting and Production Estimation System – government-led and sustained

40. The objectives of this output were to improve the capacity to provide crop monitoring, forecasting and production estimations and to enhance utilization of agro-meteorological and rainfall data for early warning and agricultural planning purposes. Although this output appears to focus primarily on crop production, the log frame does refer to livestock although this has been a relatively weak component in practice.

41. An early decision in the SIFSIA programme to allocate resources to crop-cutting by MoAF in 2007/2008 was an unfortunate one. Not only was mechanical crop-cutting financially unsustainable and ineffective in terms of coverage and early warning, it diverted resources away from what could usefully have been the development of better tailored approaches to production estimates at an early stage in the programme's life.

42. Subsequent activities have trialled a number of methods. Early evaluation of the Crop Area and Production Estimation System (CAPES) showed it to be an inefficient approach and it was abandoned; evaluation of sampling frames and agricultural statistical estimation within the NRM appears not to have had a strong influence on approaches. Subsequent efforts have focussed on the collaborative Crop & Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) based on an annual assessment involving line ministries, the World Food Programme (WFP) and FEWSNet with strong technical and financial support from SIFSIA. This exercise makes good use of other SIFSIA-supported data and analysis, including the NDVI condition, agro-meteorological data and market data. It appears to have gained the trust of donors and others in the international community that use the results. SIFSIA has also collaborated with the Global Monitoring for Food Security (GMFS)¹¹ programme which is piloting the integration of remote-sensed based approaches to crop production estimation. This is linked to validation via the CFSAM missions. The GMFS project is currently limited to North Kordofan focused on areas of rain-fed agriculture, but MoAF is giving consideration to its wider roll out which may also offer the potential for integration with land cover and land use mapping updates.

43. Monitoring of livestock production systems has been weaker, partly reflecting the lower priority this is given by government. Activities include NDVI-based monitoring of rangeland condition (reported upon in the agromet bulletins), a pilot rangeland monitoring study with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in Butana, and the trialling of a pictorial evaluation tool (PET) for livestock (see paragraph 40 below). There is an opportunity to fill the livestock data vacuum with the forthcoming agriculture census, and SIFSIA has contributed to the concept note for the census to ensure there is a livestock component.

¹¹ GMFS programme is an ESA programme supporting the evaluation of the crop yield and production estimation using low (MERIS 300m) and high resolution (SPOT 50m) satellite based data, supported by ground validation data collected by SIFSIA / CFSAM. Also providing SPOT data to output 6 Natural resource mapping

44. The latest assessment tool to be trialled by SIFSIA, for both crops and livestock, is the tailored version of PET¹². This may provide a useful rapid assessment method although it has been introduced late in SIFSIA's life and still needs to be tested and integrated into workflows (having been incorporated into the most recent CFSAM). Training on PET methods was conducted in Gezira at state level but familiarity with the tool is still low.

45. SIFSIA has provided extensive support to the Sudanese Meteorological Agency (SMA), including secondment of FAO staff to establish TAMSAT (a tropical rainfall estimation tool)¹³. Although TAMSAT still operates, there have been problems of data response and lack of formal protocols that are critical to the reporting timeline at the start of the rainy season. More recently SIFSIA has introduced another method from Rome – the FAO-Rainfall Estimate Method (RFE). Through analysis of satellite imagery this improves coverage beyond urban areas where most rain gauges are located. FAO-RFE calibrates to provide a wider and more reliable rainfall estimate. Preparations on the ground started in 2009, while installation and training was carried out in April 2011 with a technical backstopping mission from FAO in May 2011 and a further support mission in November 2011. Fast internet connections are required to run the system. SMA, with SIFSIA support, is setting up its server within the National Information Centre (NIC) to overcome these limitations. The current reliance on two parallel systems may be unnecessary once SMA feels confident of the FAO-RFE, which is simpler and fully managed by national experts. The data and analysis are fed into SAMIS, the Sudan Agro-Meteorological Information System, and used to generate agro-meteorological bulletins. Early efforts to rehabilitate the Sudan's once extensive rain gauge network have not been successful. One hundred rain gauges were established and an SMS-supported recording system. Incentives were provided to state supervisors and to readers. Despite this, daily recording has been poor – little data was delivered in 2010 and none in 2011.

46. Since 2008 SIFSIA has supported production of the Sudan Seasonal Monitor which combines data from the RFE/SAMIS and NDVI, nationwide highlighting hotspots and anomalies. This is now a reliable and regular monthly report provided between June and November by the SIFSIA-supported agro-climatology unit of SMA, although SMA recognizes the need to extend the information presented to focus more on crop and forecast conditions. It is distributed and used by line ministries – see section 6.4.

47. With support from the Natural Resources Land and Water Division (NRL) from FAO HQ, and with the utilisation of the new land cover products from SIFSIA a more comprehensive GAEZ (Global Agro-Ecological Zone) map is being undertaken for Sudan.

12 PET-Crops Sudan: A pictorial evaluation tool (PET) for crop harvest assessment in the Sudan Ian Robinson (2011) AA International Ltd. These have been tailored to crop and irrigated crop types and have developed a pilot assessment approach for livestock (cattle, goats etc) based on approaches developed for Somalia.

13 Rogerio Bonifacio was seconded to SMA to support to establishment of TAMSAT rainfall estimation systems. Uses Meteosat Second Generation IR channel ECMWF global forecast model and EUMETSAT MPE.

4.2.5 Output 5: Strengthened Food and Agricultural Market Information System (FAMIS) – government-owned and led

48. The objective was to strengthen existing market information systems and reduce duplication of market price information for basic agricultural and livestock products collected from the main markets in Sudan. Since the MTE SIFSIA has made a lot of progress in establishing the Food and Agricultural Market Information System (FAMIS). This is still in the final stages of development although it is functioning well so far. The target audience for FAMIS has expanded. As well as providing market data to decision-makers in government and beyond for food security purposes, it also now provides a market information service for farmers and traders in the agricultural sector.

49. The original development was undertaken by BusyLab, a Ghana-based company which established the Esoko platform and designed and carried out training of enumerators. This was based on a market information model that had been piloted elsewhere in Africa. However, this was a costly investment (over \$200,000) and the work has subsequently and appropriately been handed over to a national consultant who has been able to develop a simpler, localised and more robust system that should be technically more sustainable at a fraction of the cost. The FARMER platform has replaced Esoko. Final modifications to the FARMER system were planned for December 2011.

50. The market data that feeds into FAMIS is provided by enumerators from MoAF and MoARF at state level, who have been trained and receive regular incentives. The data is transmitted to Khartoum by SMS where there are now 7 supervisors also drawn from MoAF and MoARF working with the PSU to manage and oversee the system. FAMIS now covers a total of 50 crop and livestock markets (in and around the 15 State capitals), 30 of which are monitored by government staff and 20 by other organisations.

51. The data is analysed and disseminated in the Sudan Monthly Market Update Bulletin, published in both English and Arabic. This mainly provides an analysis of prices. This could be strengthened with more qualitative data, for example of sources of supply. Indeed, FAMIS outputs have become one of the more high profile parts of SIFSIA's work, and are widely welcomed for providing reliable market price data. The new FARMER system provides a simpler and more accessible interface for both users and administrators.

52. In terms of providing a market information service for the private sector, by November 2011 FARMER had over 2000 subscribers amongst traders and brokers who were receiving regular SMS data and a weekly 'flash'; this was achieved after a relatively short period of going live. The private sector focus is seen as key to supporting the sustainability of the system as a semi-commercial operation with SMS messaging supported by charges. During the field work for the evaluation discussions were underway with Sudani (a mobile and broadband service provider in Sudan) as part of efforts to ensure the sustainability of FAMIS as it is highly unlikely that government would be able to maintain it in its current form. By early 2012 a revenue-sharing agreement had been signed with Sudani. This is a positive and innovative development.

53. Unlike many other technical components of SIFSIA's work, FAMIS has been developed with minimal input from FAO. Instead, and appropriately, the PSU was given leeway to find an appropriate provider of technical support elsewhere. There has been some limited collaboration between SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S on market data collection and

analysis early on: for example, SIFSIA-N participated in the initial establishment of CliMIS (the Crop and Livestock Market Information System) in SIFSIA-S, and there was collaboration in establishing the SMS web-based system. But the potential for ongoing exchange of experience and learning between SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S does not appear to have been realised.

4.2.6 Output 6: Strengthened capacity in natural resource management information system

54. Little progress had been made in the first phase of the SIFSIA programme in natural resource mapping and land cover classification, but lost ground has been made up in the second phase following the intervention of FAO Rome to address the technical and financial constraints in accessing expensive images¹⁴. Following a visit in May 2010 of an FAO team from NRL to both SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S, a fast track approach was adopted with most of the image interpretation being undertaken by the Remote Sensing Authority (RSA) in Khartoum, by FAO in Rome and in Egypt; images were downloaded from the Egyptian receiving station. Training in ground validation was provided to a number of agencies (MoAF, the Forests National Corporation [FNC] and RSA, Humanitarian Aid Commission [HAC]) and the ground validation has now been completed to the point that the data was due for release in early December 2011. The capacity in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and remote sensing has been especially enhanced within the RSA, but is also evident in FNC, MoAF, HAC, and FSTS.

55. As a result of this work, land cover maps are close to completion and provide an enhanced update to the old Africover (based on 1999/2000 data). The data provide an important, consistent, multi-level geospatial baseline that will support many applications including crop yield and production estimation and underpin the re-examination of area sampling frames for agricultural surveys.

56. The land cover mapping has already been put to use in the (separately funded) WISDOM modelling¹⁵ of supply and demand for wood biofuel in Darfur, replicating an East African GIS analysis. This study was a collaborative effort between FNC, RSA, UNEP and SIFSIA. The draft results of the pilot in Darfur have been well-received and the work is being replicated across Sudan. This is a good illustration of the potential of the land cover mapping once the base data are assembled, which could inform policy debate and formulation around energy sources and energy use. Indeed, the availability of GIS and land cover data can give the SIFSIA programme high visibility and credibility in its final months with potential users of the information in government and within the international community, especially if the case is made in terms of how this information can be used in food security analysis, from local to federal level.

¹⁴ A report in 2008 set the scope for work that has been undertaken in phase two, including the selection of appropriate image resources and collaborative access to high resolution images acquired by the related GMFS programme.

¹⁵ WISDOM Darfur (2010) land cover mapping and Wood Energy Analysis of Darfur's IDP regions. Land and Water Division (NRL) Dec 2010. Summary report

57. Other anticipated outputs have made little progress and appear to have been over-ambitious within the scale and scope of the programme. If the logframe had been reviewed after the MTE these could have been revised to set more realistic targets. Whilst relevant to food security the anticipated mapping of water resources (wells, hafirs and groundwater) were beyond the capacity of the SIFSIA programme, as were the proposed inputs to the Nile flood modelling. The provision of IT resource to the Ministry of Irrigation & Water Resources (MoIWR) has been ineffective in advancing any of these proposed activities. The duration of the SIFSIA programme was too short to have a significant impact on this area as well as others.

4.2.7 Output 7: Enhanced ability to manage nutrition information monitoring system

58. At the time of the MTE in early 2009 there were well-developed plans for a nutrition information monitoring system – a conceptual paper had been written and an agreement signed between key UN agencies and the Ministry of Health (MoH) – but little progress had been made in putting the system in place. This began in January 2010 when the National Nutrition Coordination Unit (NNCU) was established in the MoH Primary Health Care General Directorate with SIFSIA support. SIFSIA has since provided substantial capacity-building support, training federal and state level staff, providing IT equipment, funding consultants to support the NNCU¹⁶, and funding supervisory visits at state level by federal-MoH staff. A web-based data entry, analysis and reporting system has now been designed and is in the process of being implemented, supported by technical training, manuals and e-learning materials. It is worth noting the creative use of the ToKTEN¹⁷ UNDP volunteer programme to develop the online information system. Despite the financial advantages of this arrangement, however, the reliance on voluntary labour has resulted in some delays and is a potential threat to completion. A national consultant has since been hired to complete the web-based system.

59. Thus, close to the end of the SIFSIA programme, the online system is not yet up and running although the MoH is confident that this is achievable within the time-scale of the SIFSIA no-cost extension period. The web-based system is based on a pre-existing and proven spreadsheet design which continues to be operational to generate reports while the online system is being finalized and rolled out. Since January 2011, the NNCU has produced a couple of Sudan Nutrition Bulletins.

60. Collaboration between government and international agencies has been stronger in nutrition than in many other areas of food security information. A national Nutrition Coordination Group was set up by UNICEF, comprising government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and donors. It is chaired by UNICEF and meets at least once a month. A Health Nutrition and Humanitarian Assistance Working Group was set up under the FSNWG in January 2011, and should bring together government, UN agencies, donors and national and international NGOs, with the intention of promoting the

¹⁶ A series of tools (SMART) and workflows help ensure sound data entry and quality assurance.

¹⁷ TOKTEN is Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals – an opportunity for Sudanese nationals abroad to contribute to in-country development.

government's leadership role in the sector. The nutrition focus tends to be strongly health oriented and could be broadened to capture the agricultural dimension.

61. Despite the considerable progress that has been made in nutrition information, there are three key challenges to address in future food security planning in Sudan. First, in the words of some interviewees there has been a 'poor commitment' to nutrition amongst government decision-makers. The challenge is to ensure that the nutrition information system is well integrated into food security analysis and decision-making; the IPC is one important tool for doing this. Second, as with many components of the food security information system there are concerns about variable capacity to do nutrition monitoring and state and locality levels, and ultimately the analysis can only be as good as the data that feeds into it; according to the MoH, 40% of the 170 localities in Sudan currently provide regular nutrition data. Third, there are concerns about the MoH's ability to cover the running costs of the nutrition information system when the SIFSIA programme ends, from training to supervision to the provision of basic recording equipment, although an automated web-based system may be more cost-efficient in some respects than a manually operated information system.

4.2.8 Output 8: Government-owned comprehensive food security baseline

62. As reported in the MTE, SIFSIA provided important technical and financial assistance to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and to the MoFNE in the design and execution of the Sudan Baseline Household Survey (SBHS) in 2009. This included developing a food security component to the SBHS, providing statistical training in Rome for two CBS staff, and training staff in-country. This enhanced the quality of the SBHS, which is now the principal source of data on poverty in Sudan where there had previously been a vacuum of national-level data and analysis since the previous survey in the late 1970s.

63. The food security component of the 2009 SBHS provides a useful baseline on food consumption that is widely appreciated. It also fills an information gap and provides an important update on consumption patterns, for example showing the high dependence of rural households on the market to meet their food needs. So far the analysis has been confined to food consumption and does not cover all the variables of food security. It is therefore not yet a food security baseline although the findings of the resilience study and disaggregation of the income study may provide further insights.

64. This has been SIFSIA-N's major activity in terms of engaging with the poverty dimension of food insecurity. It has had considerable impact, for example in informing the I-PRSP (see section 6.4 below).

4.3 Gender analysis

65. Gender is a key determinant of food security, in terms of livelihood strategies, engagement in food production activities, access to food and vulnerability. However, gender sensitivity and gender analysis has been absent from most SIFSIA-supported activities. From the beginning this has been a weakness in the SIFSIA programme. The programme design document only mentioned gender in passing as one of a number of cross-cutting issues but not giving any indication or guidance on how it should be incorporated into SIFSIA's work.

The annex that spells out the approach for SIFSIA-North does not mention gender at all and neither do the logframes.

66. Gender disaggregation has been weak in the data collection and analysis that SIFSIA-N has supported in the food security information side of the project. At best, there is some disaggregation according to male and female-headed households, for example in the Sudan Baseline Household Survey and in the Food Security Study in White Nile State, but there is no intra-household disaggregation of data. The findings about differences between male and female-headed households are mentioned more in passing in the documents produced and are not always carried through to the executive summary as key findings or with implications for recommendations. Some SIFSIA-supported activities have almost totally ignored gender, for example the livelihood zoning exercise led by FEWSNet in August 2011. The EU's monitoring mission in 2010 describes the SIFSIA documentation as 'gender-blind' and comments on the lack of gender differentiated data collection and analysis, but the programme does not appear to have responded to this critique.

67. In short, the SIFSIA programme appears to fall into the category of FAO projects identified by FAO's recent gender evaluation that ignored the gender dimension (35 to 40% of all projects)¹⁸. Lack of gender awareness by the PSU and other technical support staff from FAO involved in the SIFSIA programme mean that this has not been promoted as an important factor affecting food security in the capacity-building work with the FSTS and other line ministries in Sudan. Despite this, the recent review and inventory of food security policies carried out by the FSTS does recognise women as a particular target group for certain policy interventions, applying a 'Women in Development' (WID) lens. However, gender analysis that pays attention to the relational nature of gender and the differential impact on men and women has been missing.

68. There is no gender breakdown of numbers of people who have benefited from SIFSIA-N training – again an oversight – although interviews conducted during the evaluation mission indicate that a substantial proportion of staff who have been trained have been women.

69. Staffing of the PSU has been male-dominated since the programme began. The gender balance in the FSTS has been better although there are still few women in key positions of responsibility. The FAMIS team is well-balanced: 50% of enumerators and 5 of the 7 FAMIS supervisors are female.

4.4 Financial analysis

Table 2. SIFSIA-N Budget Expenditure Table December 2006 to November 2011

| | Revised Budget (As per Addendum 1) | Expenditure | % of imple- mentat ion |
|--|---|-------------|---------------------------------|
|--|---|-------------|---------------------------------|

¹⁸ These were assessed as 'missed opportunities' by the evaluation in terms of recognising the relevance and importance of gender equality concerns to their stated objectives (FAO, 2011)

| | | | |
|--|------------|-----------|------|
| 1. Food Security Analysis, Policy and Planning | | | |
| Food Security Secretariat - | 671,063 | 645,481 | |
| Coordination Unit North | | | 96% |
| Food Security in Crisis | 637,273 | 314,264 | |
| Analysis Section | | | 49% |
| Structural Food Security | 578,733 | 546,995 | |
| Analysis Section | | | 95% |
| Policy and Planning Section | 43,750 | 43,750 | 100% |
| Subtotal Food Security Analysis, Policy and Planning | 1,930,819 | 1,550,490 | 80% |
| 2. Baselines and Information Systems | | | |
| Household Food Consumption | 710,567 | 891,289 | |
| and Welfare Survey | | | 125% |
| Agriculture and Livestock | 667,730 | 594,559 | |
| Market Information System | | | 89% |
| Crop Production Monitoring | 599,364 | 609,786 | |
| and Forecast (Crop Cutting) | | | 102% |
| Crop Production Monitoring | 514,632 | 546,483 | |
| and Forecast (SMA) | | | 106% |
| Natural Resource Management | 133,333 | 419,133 | |
| Monitoring and Mapping | | | 314% |
| Basic Capacity Building for | 440,011 | 427,442 | |
| Public Institutions | | | 97% |
| Subtotal Survey and Information System | 3,065,637 | 3,488,692 | 114% |
| 3. Decentralized Food Security and Research Fund | 242,868 | 284,554 | 117% |
| 4. Northern | | | |
| Programme Support | | | |
| Unit | 4,386,844 | 3,859,914 | 88% |
| Subtotal Direct Project | | | |
| Costs | 9,626,168 | 9,183,650 | 95% |
| 5. Executing Agency | | | |
| Overhead | 673,832 | 503,708 | 75% |
| Subtotal Northern | | | |
| Sudan Sub-Program | 10,300,000 | 9,687,358 | 94% |
| | 10,300,000 | 9,687,358 | 94% |
| PSU total | 5,060,676 | 4,363,622 | |
| Source: PSU | | | |

70. The table above shows that overall expenditure is within budget, although it is worth noting the additional expenditure on natural resource management monitoring and mapping. Financial commitments had been 3% short of the overall budget due to the Italian government failing to meet its intended contribution. However, 300,000 Euros has since been made up through other FAO expenditure, for example on natural resources and information management/

71. GOS was supposed to make substantial financial contributions to the SIFSIA programme from the beginning, but these have been notoriously difficult to track as there was

little transparency in the amounts provided by the MoAF, nor in how they were spent. With the establishment of the FSTS, however, MoFNE is making a regular contribution of SDG 50,000 per month to cover salaries and some other running costs.

4.5 Overall conclusions on effectiveness and efficiency

72. Overall, SIFSIA-N has made impressive achievements since 2009, and has been much more effective in the second phase of the programme than in the first phase. However, early delays in implementation of the SIFSIA programme from the first phase still haunt the programme and limit its overall effectiveness. For example, although the nutrition information system has now been established, there will be minimal time for the online system to be tried and tested and for problems to be addressed before the SIFSIA programme ends. Similarly, FAMIS is still in the final stages of development rather than being well-established and having run for some months unaided before the PSU staff are withdrawn. Ideally the programme would have reached this point at least two years earlier to have had a chance to embed the food security information system within federal government and to ensure that it was fully functioning before the programme ended. As a result and despite significant achievements, the food security information system still tends to be a patchwork of different components rather than a coherent and integrated system. To have achieved the latter in the context of Sudan would probably take much longer than the life of the SIFSIA project.

73. The establishment of the FSTS is one of the greatest achievements of the second phase. It has successfully brought different line ministries together (with some significant gaps) and currently plays a useful coordination role although its full potential as a unit conducting cutting-edge food security analysis and policy-related work is yet to be realised.

74. SIFSIA-N has made greatest progress on the technical information side of the project. It has raised awareness of food security within line ministries at federal level and has strengthened information and analysis for food security decision-making. On the technical information side, areas where SIFSIA-N has been weaker are either due to the sectoral focus the programme has taken – see section 5.4 below – or because the project was simply too ambitious and it was impossible with the time and resources available to achieve all that it set out to do.

75. Through trialling different approaches to data collection and analysis the PSU has learned what works and has applied those lessons during the programme's lifetime, for example in the way it has adapted FAMIS and in trialling different methods of crop production assessment. But sometimes it has been unclear whether a new approach has been introduced and trialled in response to the food security information needs and government capacity of Sudan, or whether it has been driven by the availability of a particular technology that a department in FAO is promoting, for example the GIEWS Workstation.

76. As explained in section 6.4 there is evidence of the food security information supported and/ or provided by SIFSIA being used by government, but overall the programme has made little progress on the policy side of the project. To some extent this is a consequence of the prevailing policy context of Sudan during the lifetime of the SIFSIA programme when food security has been a low priority within government, and this has been reflected in the failure so far to establish the full institutional set-up envisaged for food security, in particular the Food Security Council. It is also a consequence of FAO's emphasis

in the programme, focussing much more on the technical information side and on the skills needed to get a food security information system up and running. The policy side has received much less emphasis and this evaluation would argue that policy formulation and influencing work requires a very different approach and skill-sets.

5 Coverage of SIFSIA

5.1 *National vs state*

77. Despite the MTE recommendation to focus more on capacity-building at state level, SIFSIA-N did not change its emphasis and has remained federal-focused. Members of the SIFSIA-N Steering Committee SC appear split on this issue with some believing that there should have been a more state-oriented focus in the programme while others believe that the federal focus was appropriate in view of the state-focus of SIFSIA's sister project, the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP). Following the MTE this was clearly a dilemma for the programme. With no further resources available it could not stretch to state-level without dropping some planned activities and inputs at federal level, and there was an understandable concern that the resources would be so diluted if re-directed to state-level that they would have minimal impact.

78. Nevertheless, there has been engagement with, and training of state-level government officers for some components of the food security information system, particularly market data collection through FAMIS, for the nutrition information system, and for the IPC. The fundamental problem is a lack of government funding for data collection at state and locality levels, negatively impacting data availability and consistency, in turn undermining the reliability of analysis such as the IPC.

79. In view of the generally low level of capacity for food security information, analysis and decision-making at state level, the heavy federal focus of SIFSIA looks more like a design fault. Ultimately, an effective food security information system at federal level depends upon consistent and reliable data at state level implying there should have been more investment in building capacity at state-level throughout the programme. To some extent this will be addressed by the food security project that follows on from SIFSIA which will be targeted at state level. Indeed, the Action Fiche for the new project states that building capacity in food security at state level 'is believed to be the lynchpin of the overall food security development in the country'¹⁹.

5.2 *Geographic*

80. SIFSIA has carried out training in all fifteen states of Sudan, but its engagement with conflict-affected states is minimal, mainly attributed to lack of access for government staff within the respective state due to insecurity. The implications of this are discussed in section 5.5 below.

81. The recommendation in the MTE that SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S should collaborate in giving more attention to the three 'transitional' areas on the border with South Sudan was not

¹⁹ Mengistu (2011): 4

followed through. This has been a missed opportunity since SIFSIA embraced the whole of Sudan, in the spirit of the CPA in 2005, and the two elements of SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S could have collaborated to raise awareness of the food security issues affecting areas on both sides of the new border. However, SIFSIA-N did support the MoAF in preparing some strategic documents on the transitional states and in the last months of the project has commissioned a study on the impact of secession.

5.3 *Vulnerable groups*

82. SIFSIA-N's main contribution on poverty issues was its support to the SBHS. In other SIFSIA-supported exercises where data and analysis are broken down, most notably in the IPC to give some indication of differential food security across the country, it is at a high level of geographic aggregation according to administrative boundaries. This high level of aggregation is also evident in the recent livelihood zoning exercise although this usefully goes beyond administrative boundaries. To some extent this is inevitable in a federally-focused programme, but what is missing is more detailed and disaggregated analysis of social inclusion and vulnerability with respect to age, gender, ethnicity or livelihood group although these are all important determinants in Sudan. The weak engagement of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS) in the SIFSIA programme has clearly been a constraint, as well as government biases which frequently equate food security with food self-sufficiency.

83.

84. Overall, although SIFSIA has contributed to a deeper understanding of poverty issues in Sudan, access to food has not been given as much attention as food production in food security analyses. For example, the CFSAM, one of the key sources on the state of food security in Sudan each year, tends to be crop production-oriented rather than commenting more broadly on overall food security. The new state-level food security project is an opportunity to address vulnerability and food access issues more thoroughly through more disaggregated data collection and analysis.

85.

5.4 *Sectoral*

86. While SIFSIA-N has been effective in bringing line ministries together to address food security, the bias towards agriculture and crop production that was established at an early stage in programme implementation has continued. This is partly a consequence of the institutional location of the programme within MoAF. Early on this fuelled the perception that it was a Ministry of Agriculture programme. This has been exacerbated by MoAF's domination of the programme's Steering Committee and by the rivalry that exists between MoAF and MoARF. All of this has got in the way of the PSU's efforts to more fully engage MoARF in the SIFSIA project; MoARF's main participation has been in FAMIS and the annual CFSAM. A similar pattern is repeated at state level; where the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Animal Resources have split into two ministries, the computer equipment provided by SIFSIA appears to have been taken by MoAF, at least in Kassala and Gedaref states. As explained under Outputs 2 and 4 in section 4.2 above, the consequence has been limited coverage by SIFSIA of livestock and livestock-dependent livelihood groups despite the significance of both in Sudan and despite the encouragement from the MTE to give more attention to the livestock sector. SIFSIA has tended to mirror rather than challenge government bias towards crop production over livestock production. As mentioned above, the

limited engagement of MoWSS in the SIFSIA programme and in the FSTS is also concerning in terms of sectoral balance.

5.5 *Development vs humanitarian*

87. In follow-up reporting to the management response to the MTE, FAO/ the PSU made a distinction between ‘developing a sustainable information system and providing regular emergency focussed food security information’. This sharp distinction reflects the development/ humanitarian divide that permeates international aid and many international agencies, but it is not a helpful one in relation to food security information systems. To be effective and relevant, a food security information system must be able to monitor and identify both chronic and acute food insecurity. The PSU clearly and appropriately wanted to avoid being overwhelmed by the emergency information needs of the international community in Sudan, and rightly prides itself on being one of the few sources of food security analysis across the country. But the fact remains that the programme has been relatively weak in capturing and drawing attention to cases of acute/ emergency food security. Where it does so, this is usually in relation to drought-related acute food insecurity. Its coverage of conflict-related food insecurity is very poor. Although the FSTS carried out a brief assessment in South Kordofan after the outbreak of violent conflict in 2011, the IPC did not cover South Kordofan in the second half of 2011 although there was a critical need for such an analysis. The challenges for SIFSIA and the FSTS to cover conflict-affected states are complicated and political, although the FSTS could benefit from more training in the future in how to conduct rapid emergency assessments.

88. The protracted humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region means that it has been better covered than other regions in terms of food security monitoring by international agencies and this has been one of the main reasons for SIFSIA to pay less attention to Darfur. The data generated by international agencies has fed into the IPC which results in some comparative analysis of food security across the country. SIFSIA was also involved in an initiative to contract an international team to carry out a livelihood study in Darfur in 2010/11, that unfortunately never got off the ground.

6 *Relevance and impact*

6.1 *Relevance to the food security context*

89. Despite a period of rapid economic growth in Sudan, high levels of poverty and food insecurity persist for a significant proportion of the population. The SIFSIA programme is therefore highly relevant in strengthening government’s ability to assess and analyse the extent and causes of food insecurity. It has made a significant contribution at a time when reliable data were scarce. Not only has SIFSIA-N strengthened government’s ability to monitor the annual vagaries of food security related to the agricultural season, it has also made a substantial contribution in making available recent data and analysis on poverty by supporting the SBHS. However, its contribution to monitoring the range of causes of food insecurity has not been even and it has faced difficulties covering acute food insecurity triggered by conflict. SIFSIA has also been a little slow in exploring and exposing the consequences of secession on food security. Although it supported two studies (a WISDOM study on wood-fuel that showed the extent of Darfur’s dependence on woodfuel from South Sudan, and the FEWSNet study on the cereal trade) and prepared a presentation to the MoAF

Under-Secretary on some of the issues, an early and well-researched overview of the food security implications of secession would have been highly relevant. This is now underway in the final months of the programme.

6.2 *Relevance to the overall priorities of government*

90. Food security has not been high on federal government's agenda during much of the lifetime of the SIFSIA programme and this has clearly held back what the programme was able to achieve, most notably in establishing the institutional set-up and high-level Food Security Council that could have facilitated food security policy-making, but also affecting government's financial contribution to SIFSIA. The Agricultural Revival Programme was a government priority but SIFSIA-N had no links to the ARP which limited its ability to be close to the centre of government decision-making. However, government's priorities appear to be changing with secession and the associated loss of oil revenues, particularly coinciding with a poor agricultural season in 2011 which has depressed agricultural production and caused food prices to rise. As described in section 4.2 (output 1) there may be a window of opportunity opening during the final months of the SIFSIA programme when there is greater concern about food insecurity at high political levels.

6.3 *Relevance to the information and policy needs of government ministries*

91. SIFSIA's contribution in making hard data available to line ministries appears to be widely appreciated, particularly by some members of the civil service who lament the decline in government's ability to collect and analyse data because of lack of resources. Reliable data that is now available through new technologies, for example for rainfall monitoring, is welcomed. In the words of one government officer it has helped to make the case for presenting and organizing 'scientific data rather than hearsay or anecdotal information'. SIFSIA's work has been particularly relevant to the information needs of MoAF with its focus on crop production and agro-meteorological monitoring. Close engagement between SIFSIA and SRCo has ensured that some of SIFSIA's work has been directly relevant to their information and policy needs – see section 6.4 below. Support to the National Nutrition Coordination Unit in enhancing nutrition information has been relevant to the MoH and to its concern to raise the profile of nutrition. And the market price data collected and analysed by SIFSIA meets the information needs of a wide range of government ministries. SIFSIA may not have uniformly met the information needs of all government ministries that it is engaged with and that are concerned with food security. The MoARF, for example, listed a number of topics on which it would have liked more information, for example on animal products and especially milk production. The PSU indicates that there is scope to expand the number of products covered by FAMIS in terms of market data collection.

6.4 *Extent of utilization of SIFSIA outputs*

6.4.1 *By government at national level*

92. The culture of evidence-based decision-making is generally weak in Sudan. The extent to which SIFSIA-generated data and analysis are being used by federal government is therefore encouraging. SIFSIA's outputs are valued for ongoing monitoring purposes. There appears to have been a high level of utilization of SIFSIA's seasonal updates and data on food prices during the 2011 agricultural season. In the words of the Under-Secretary of the

Ministry of Agriculture: ‘we depend completely on SIFSIA’s information for this year’s production season’. The head of FSTS regularly attends meetings of the Council of Ministers, often to report upon current food security indicators such as food prices and FAMIS market price data is being used by the high-level Economic Sector Ministerial Committee. When the poor rainfall season of 2011 became apparent through this regular monitoring, the Ministry of Agriculture responded by paying greater attention to the irrigated sector to try and make up some of the shortfall in rainfed crop production. The results of a survey of recipients of the Sudan Monthly Market Update indicated that 83% found it to be ‘very useful or essential’ to their decision-making. The overall sample was relatively small, but most were government officers.

93. SIFSIA-generated outputs have also been used by government for longer-term planning purposes: apparently the SIFSIA-funded study on food security in White Nile State and other studies fed into government’s 3-year plan for 2011-13. The SBHS and the food security component that was part of it have been essential sources of information for the I-PRSP. A number of government officers referred to the importance of now having updated and reliable poverty data, some of which may dispel widely held assumptions or beliefs, for example that the rural population produced most of its own food whereas the results of the SBHS shows a high dependence on bought food. The MoWSS have used some of the poverty data in targeting their cash transfer project.

94. Having requested the cereal availability study and warehousing study SRCo have made use of both. The cereal availability study guided their decisions on where to purchase new stock in 2010/11, and the warehouse study informed their programme of silo construction.

95. The annual CFSAM and the IPC analysis are used for early warning purposes, for example by HAC.

96. These examples are a credit to the trust that the PSU team (and by extension the SIFSIA programme) has built up with government in a context more often characterized by distrust and suspicion between government and international agencies. But despite these positive examples there is little evidence that SIFSIA has really influenced higher level policy-making in federal government and it may still have quite low visibility at the Under-Secretary and Ministerial levels beyond MoAF. Addressing this is key for the final months of the SIFSIA programme, to raise the profile of what it has done, to create demand for its outputs and as new data becomes available, for example, land cover data.

6.4.2 By government at state level

97. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation mission to investigate how SIFSIA-generated analysis is being used at state level, apart from in the two states visited: Gedaref and Kassala states. However, both were able to cite examples of how the IPC analysis had been used in decision-making. In Gedaref state, normally regarded as food secure, it revealed pockets of food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition. The MoH at state level has used this information to lobby for resources to respond from the *Wali* as well as from international agencies like WFP and UNICEF. In Kassala state the IPC analysis drew attention to the lack of fodder and resulted in a shift in emphasis in the MoAF to encouraging fodder production rather than wheat production. SIFSIA’s warehousing study drew attention to the lack of

storage capacity in Kassala state, in response to which the Director-General for Agriculture has been advocating for investment in more storage capacity. In both states the MoH has promoted vegetable production to improve diet in certain areas, apparently facilitated by the closer working relationship that developed with MoAF through the IPC work. The MoH in Khartoum cited an example of 6 states passing legislation to allow iodised salt to be sold in response to nutrition information that revealed micro-nutrient deficiencies. The value of having reliable data as a result of SIFSIA's support rather than estimates was echoed at state level as at federal level.

98. A number of interviewees at state level lamented the one-way flow of data, from state to federal level, and few are receiving the various bulletins and updates produced by FSTS. Although available on the internet, they are not easy to find and access and few government officers at state level have access to computers. This issue deserves attention to ensure that information and analysis are flowing regularly back to line ministries at state level.

6.4.3 Amongst international agencies

99. Some international agencies that have worked closely with SIFSIA are regular consumers and users of their products and analysis. For example, FEWSNet depends heavily on FAMIS for market data to feed into its food security analysis. The World Bank also uses FAMIS market data and SIFSIA's seasonal updates to monitor the performance of the agricultural season. UNDP's Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project (CRMA) describes SIFSIA as a 'leading contributor' to their information sharing platform and have made good use of SIFSIA data in their analysis. WFP also values the insights they gain from SIFSIA data (market price data and also IPC analysis) for the areas where they have no presence in Sudan and are therefore not carrying out their own monitoring. Some international NGOs have used SIFSIA-generated data to justify their programming decisions and in writing project proposals; the market price data and livelihood zoning data were mentioned most frequently. As described above, the land cover data has been used for bio-fuel mapping in Darfur.

100. Despite these positive examples SIFSIA's visibility in, and outreach to the international community is quite weak, and the FSTS's even weaker. Important donors have very little knowledge of SIFSIA's work and of the information it produces, particularly on the humanitarian side. Although there is some awareness of the IPC work there is also deep scepticism about the data that feeds into the analysis which is in danger of threatening the overall credibility of the IPC. Indeed, the wider adoption of the IPC across UN and other international agencies has not yet translated into wider engagement with the process in Sudan. There is only limited involvement of a couple of UN agencies – WFP and UNICEF – and even so WFP relies upon its own food security monitoring system in its areas of operation rather than the IPC analysis. Wider buy-in would benefit the process and would strengthen the utility of the products.

101. The tense relationship between government and much of the international community does not make it easy for SIFSIA to straddle the chasm between the two, and it has rightly prioritized producing data and information for government during the programme's life-time. However, more could be done to raise awareness of SIFSIA's work with the international community, especially to raise awareness of the existence of the FSTS.

The Food Security and Nutrition Working Group is a key opportunity for achieving this, and it is unfortunate that it has met only once so far to bring government and the international community together. Participation in, and presentations to the Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) cluster meeting, coordinated by FAO, is another opportunity. Indeed, where the FSTS or PSU staff have presented to the FSL meeting the feedback has been positive.

7 Connectedness

7.1 *Complementarity and synergy with SPCRP*

102. Implementation of the SPCRP alongside SIFSIA was one of the main reasons for SIFSIA's federal focus as SPCRP was focused at state-level. These two sister projects were thus intended to complement each other. In practice, however, the complementarity appears to have been weak, despite a matrix having been drawn up to guide cooperation. There has been little collaboration between the capacity-building work of the two programmes, and little evidence that SIFSIA has benefited from SPCRP's training at state level. Coordination between the two projects got off to a bad start as implementation of SPCRP was delayed and there was a poor relationship between the respective CTAs during the first phase. With the change in CTAs relationships have improved but synergy between the two projects is still weak. This was commented upon in the SPCRP mid-term evaluation as a 'missed opportunity'²⁰. A matrix was drawn up to guide collaboration and coordination and for a short time tri-partite meetings were held between FAO, GNU and the EU Delegation to discuss both projects. Overall, however, these have had little impact.

7.2 *Coordination with other food security information systems*

103. SIFSIA-N has developed constructive relationships with other food security information initiatives in Sudan. It has had a particularly close and productive relationship with FEWSNet, jointly carrying out capacity-building activities and providing complementary inputs to the IPC training. While SIFSIA introduced the IPC, FEWSNet carried out livelihood zoning at national level which should enhance the IPC analysis. FEWSNet has also worked closely with the FSTS which has facilitated their access to state level. FEWSNet, SIFSIA-N and FSTS collaborated in carrying out a rapid mid-season assessment across North Sudan in July/ August 2011.

104. The relationship between SIFSIA and WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) is also good although WFP VAM tends to operate more independently. As mentioned above, however, it uses FAMIS market data and the IPC analysis to complement its own geographical coverage of food security monitoring. The annual CFSAM formally brings together SIFSIA, FEWSNet, WFP VAM and the FSTS as a coordinated activity. This collaboration should be built upon so that the CFSAM deepens to provide a more holistic analysis of food security.

7.3 *Links with the FAO/ EU Global Partnership & 'Food Security Information for Action'*

²⁰ Nicholson et al (2010) 'Mid-term Evaluation of the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP), 26 April to 18 May 2010', FAO

105. Both the IPC initiative (at FAO level) and the ‘Food Security Information for Action’ programme are part of the FAO/ EU Global Partnership. SIFSIA has had inputs from the latter. FAO had funding for five countries for the IPC. This did not include Sudan for which the SIFSIA budget was used instead. While SIFSIA has been linked into the wider IPC project – for example it will translate version 2 of the IPC into Arabic before the end of the programme – continued support from FAO to strengthen the IPC will be essential in Sudan. See Section 6 below.

8 Sustainability

106. In order to sustain the work and activities that SIFSIA-N has introduced and supported during the lifetime of the programme, two ingredients are essential: political commitment and financial resources. The former is a pre-requisite for the latter. The establishment of the FSC before the SIFSIA programme ends in April 2012 would be the strongest indication of political commitment on the part of GoS. Without the FSC heading up the institutional structure that was envisaged for food security in Sudan, the long-term viability of the FSTS cannot be assured. Sudan’s history of previous food security projects aimed at building government capacity that have disappeared with little trace when international funding and technical support has ended is a warning of the challenges of achieving sustainability²¹. Concerns about sustainability post-SIFSIA were raised frequently in interviews with government officers.

107. The fact that the GoS appears to have delivered only a small percentage of its planned financial contribution to SIFSIA during the first four years of the programme when government budgets were less constrained (before the secession of South Sudan) is a worrying indicator of the prospects for sustainability²². After much negotiation and lobbying, it is encouraging that FSTS costs have been included in government budgets for 2012, but there is still a question mark over whether the resources will be delivered and will be adequate for it to continue its work. When the top-ups provided to FSTS staff by the SIFSIA programme end, there is also the risk that some of the best staff may seek higher remuneration elsewhere.

108. Some components of the food security information system supported by SIFSIA will not be technically sustainable by the time the programme ends, partly a consequence of delays in implementation in the early years. The IPC is a case in point. Although good progress has been made in introducing the IPC at federal and state levels as a tool of analysis for food security which has been widely welcomed, it requires further investment and support to realise its full potential and to build credibility with decision-makers. Further investment is needed to strengthen data collection and therefore the quality of data that feeds into the IPC, and also to strengthen the analysis process itself. Some other components of the food security information system are unlikely to be financially sustainable when the SIFSIA programme ends and will still be dependent on the technical input of PSU staff. As well as the CFSAM FAMIS falls into this category and is likely to require continued external funding and technical support to become fully established and viable beyond April 2012. There is also a question mark over the online nutrition information system that is still in the process of

²¹ See the MTE report for SIFSIA-N from 2009 (Buchanan-Smith et al, 2009)

²² Lack of transparency makes it difficult to know exactly how much government’s contribution has been, although a figure of 15% of its intended contribution is quite frequently mentioned

development, supported by a consultant funded by SIFSIA. This arrangement was due to end in November 2011 although the MoH was confident that this support arrangement would continue even after the individual had returned to their post in the Ministry. This needs to be carefully monitored as there will be little time for the fully-fledged system to be up and running before the SIFSIA programme ends for trouble-shooting and addressing technical and other issues that may arise. Again, support and input from another agency (e.g. UNICEF and/ or WFP) beyond the SIFSIA programme may help to ensure the longer-term sustainability of the nutrition information system.

109. Some other elements of SIFSIA's capacity-building efforts are better embedded within government institutions, for example agro-meteorological, remote sensing and GIS skills within the SMA and RSA. Capacity was already quite strong and has been intensified by SIFSIA in terms of skills and new technologies. Key to sustainability will be continued government funding for operational costs. One of the greatest risks is the dependence on a few key individuals who became the focus of training and capacity-building efforts. If those individuals should leave some of SIFSIA's work could be quickly undone.

110. Developing an accessible food security portal for the programme's outputs and other food security information will enhance sustainability by raising awareness of the work of the programme and of the FSTS in particular. This has been slow to be established and the SIFSIA website hosted by FAO is currently the main source of information on the programme, supplemented by individual websites such as FAMIS and the nutrition information system. Although FSTS had started to establish a web presence this has happened late in the life of the SIFSIA programme and is not yet available. It will be hosted locally by the National information Centre (NIC) which should be a positive factor contributing to its sustainability and effective maintenance. The NIC is host to other servers critical to the SIFSIA programme, including the SMA and nutrition information system.

111. The PSU had drafted an exit strategy by the time this final evaluation began. This is a useful stock-take on progress made to date against the programme's outputs, indicating what it would take for these outputs to be completed and sustained in an ideal world. However, it needs to be expanded to analyze where the biggest threats to sustainability lie, and to indicate which activities the PSU (with FAO's wider support) should prioritise in the last few months of the SIFSIA programme to maximize the chance for key components of the programme to continue effectively beyond April 2012.

9 Management and reporting

9.1 Overview of management arrangements

112. Had the institutional set-up within government envisaged in the SIFSIA design document been implemented, the management and direction of the programme and of the FSTS would most likely have been stronger and more driven by high levels of government. In the absence of the FSC and a functioning Food Security Technical Committee, the Programme Steering Committee has been the key body in-country managing the SIFSIA programme.

113. Some of the management weaknesses of the programme were apparent at the time of the MTE and it was hoped that the agreement that had been reached between the GNU, EC

and FAO in November 2008 to convene regular tripartite meetings to review progress of the SIFSIA programme (as well as SPCRP) would improve management and performance, but as noted above, these meetings did not continue.

114. As well as the Programme SC in-country, much of the management burden is carried by FAO HQ.

9.2 *Role of Programme Steering Committee*

115. The SC evolved out of the SIFSIA Task Force which oversaw the appraisal and design of the programme. It is an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Under-Secretary of the MoAF and includes participation of the EC and FAO.

116. In practice the SC's role has mainly been to approve SIFSIA-N's work plans and reports and to monitor progress. It has been much weaker in giving SIFSIA strategic direction or in providing significant technical input, guidance or feedback on SIFSIA's work.

117. Participation of line ministries in the SC has also been variable. While some participate actively, a number of others rarely attend SC meetings. The MTE recommendation that the Chair of the SC should be a rotating one was not taken up and there is a sense that the SC continues to be driven by, and seen as the responsibility of the MoAF rather than as a genuine inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral responsibility.

118. Recognising the need for more technical input and guidance into the programme, the PSU requested approval from the SC to set up a small technical committee of independent peer reviewers during the second phase of the project. Unfortunately this was turned down on the assumption that the SC would play this role itself although it has not done so successfully. Undoubtedly the PSU would have benefited greatly from the inputs and guidance that a small group of senior independent peer reviewers could have provided.

9.3 *Within FAO*

119. SIFSIA-N has continued to be managed by the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) in FAO, supported by the Food Security and Agricultural Projects Analysis Service (ESAF), and a project task force that comprises a number of different technical departments in FAO HQ. This has generally worked well and the PSU have appreciated the support and responsiveness of managers and colleagues in FAO HQ. What may be lacking, however, is a sense of overall technical leadership to guide the PSU strategically as each technical department tends to focus on its own area of expertise. In practice this has sometimes meant that too much responsibility has fallen on the PSU to decide whether the different technologies and approaches that FAO has to offer are appropriate to the context or not. Stronger technical leadership from FAO would help to re-orient from what FAO has to offer to what is needed in Sudan and objectively deciding from where it can best be sourced, whether from FAO or elsewhere.

120. As commented upon in the MTE, the lines of reporting and communicating between the PSU and the FAO Representative are not clear as a result of the centralised management structure emanating from Rome. Much therefore depends on the informal working relationship developed between the CTA and the FAO(R) in-country. It is a credit to the current CTA that this relationship has worked, but opportunities for the FAO(R) to support

SIFSIA at higher political levels in government may have been missed, especially in relation to establishing the FSC.

9.4 *The PSU*

121. The management of the PSU has notably improved since the MTE, and since the Acting CTA was confirmed in post in 2009. The strategy to recruit high-calibre national consultants through head-hunting to replace international advisory positions has worked very well. Some duplicating roles have been dropped, for example the role of Programme Manager which appeared to duplicate the role of CTA, and other important positions have been created, for example the Liaison Officer²³. The PSU team now appears to be working effectively, is well-managed and committed, and is performing to a high standard and to a high level of productivity.

9.5 *Reporting*

122. Generally, reporting by SIFSIA-N has been clear, consistent and thorough although activities and outputs do seem to get muddled with higher level achievements/ outcomes. The reporting schedule was appropriately extended from quarterly to six-monthly and was therefore a less demanding schedule.

123. The biggest issue around reporting is the appropriateness of the log-frame as a planning tool for a programme of this kind. There is a sense that the project set off on a particular track according to a set of agreed outputs and then adhered to that track with little incentive to be flexible, opportunistic and constantly adapting to a dynamic environment although this would arguably have been a more appropriate way of working, particularly in relation to food security policy in Sudan. Although the PSU was responsive to demands for particular studies, for example the cereal availability and warehouse studies, it was less geared to reading and responding to the changing political economy in its efforts to inform and influence policy-making. The log-frame is supposed to be a flexible planning and management tool, but in practice this is rarely the case and it incentivises monitoring and reporting against the log-frame outputs. Instead it may have been more appropriate to have worked to a series of higher level objectives and to have adjusted the activities and work-plans each year, or more frequently according to the circumstances.

10 *Lessons learned*

10.1 *For supporting ISFNS and policy-making in Sudan*

124. The experience of implementing SIFSIA-N over a five-year period provides valuable learning for implementing future information systems for food security in Sudan, especially information systems that consciously extend to informing policy and decision-making. Much of this learning is of immediate relevance to the new food security project that will commence with a state level focus in 2012.

²³ It should be noted, however, that contracts usually had to end before roles were made redundant. Early proactive action does not seem to have been taken

10.1.1 The concept and design

125. The SIFSIA programme was well-conceived and the formulation process was consultative and inclusive of a wide range of relevant stakeholders. It promoted a holistic approach to food security, covering access to food (and social protection) as well as food production, although biases crept in at this early stage with most attention given to crop production and very little attention given to livestock. Nutrition was poorly covered although the programme has since re-dressed this imbalance.

126. The programme was overly-ambitious in scope and objectives with the resources available, especially in view of the low priority given to food security by government at the time and the fact that there was no institutional culture of multi-sectoral working across line ministries. The experience of SIFSIA-N shows how it takes time for such a programme to become operational and effective, and especially to build relationships with government that are key to its success. (However, some of FAO's early delays in getting the programme off the ground were excessive. This is covered in more detail in the MTE). To achieve all that SIFSIA set out to do would have required greater financial resources, a wider skill-set beyond technical food security information skills, and a longer time-frame to establish and embed a credible food security information system that is well-known and well-used within federal government.

127. With hindsight, it would have been appropriate for SIFSIA to have invested more in food security data collection and analysis at state level. Although it has made substantial progress at federal level, the quality and accuracy of analysis at this level is ultimately constrained by the quality of data collected and analysed at state level which is currently weak in Sudan and can undermine the credibility of outputs at the national level. This does not mean the SIFSIA programme should have been entirely state-focused, but had it been less ambitious in its scope and/ or better-resourced it could have been more balanced in its investment between federal and state levels.

10.1.2 The context

128. Reforming the institutional set-up for food security information and policy-making within federal government in Khartoum was a noble but highly ambitious 'output' over which the programme ultimately had little control. As the challenges of implementing this component of the SIFSIA programme became apparent in a context in which other issues were prioritised by government over food security, the programme should have adapted its approach. The learning here is that high level political backing within federal government was required to realise the full potential of the SIFSIA programme, and especially to influence the institutional set-up. Relationships should have been built at a senior level with the strategically important ARP. This would have required high-level leadership from both FAO and the EU working strategically and in a sustained manner with key individuals within government; this was beyond the capacity of the PSU.

10.1.3 The understanding

129. There has long been a tendency in Sudan to equate food security with food self-sufficiency and to overlook the poverty/ vulnerability dimension of food security. It would

have been helpful to have developed a conceptual framework at the outset of the project that captured the holistic and multi-sectoral nature of food security. This was subsequently developed by the PSU but ongoing work needs to be done by FAO to promote and explain the model, and there is still work to be done to fully integrate the different components of the food security information system that have been developed by the SIFSIA programme within federal government.

10.1.4 Capacity-building

130. Capacity-building must start with a comprehensive assessment of existing capacity and of how this falls short of achieving the programme's activities and outputs within the respective institution, to some extent done by SIFSIA-N. Training must then be tailored and targeted to strengthen the skills set of individuals to achieve those activities and outputs. This means investing time and resources in planning and in carrying out a capacity needs assessment before capacity-building programmes begin. One-off participation in training courses is not enough for effective and sustained capacity-building. There must be follow-up and on-the-job training and mentoring. It must also be made clear what outputs are expected from trainees after they have completed a training programme, and the institutional support that will be required to make it happen. Where possible and feasible, ensuring those individuals share their training and knowledge with other colleagues should be an essential part of the training contract.

131. SIFSIA-N has tended to target a few key motivated individuals within different government ministries in its capacity-building approach. Whether this was appropriate and effective in the circumstances will require follow-up monitoring.

132. Collaborating with other organizations that support capacity-building in food security information systems has proved effective, has promoted a coordinated approach and has extended the impact of the SIFSIA programme, for example collaboration with FEWSNet in livelihoods zoning that will benefit the IPC.

10.1.5 Implementation

133. A key learning from the experience of SIFSIA-N is that different skill-sets are required for establishing and running a food information system and for engaging in food security policy-making. Technical data collection and analysis skills are required for the former; skills in policy research and analysis, and in monitoring and understanding the political economy of policy-making are required for the latter. FAO has given greatest priority to technical food security information skills in its recruitment of PSU staff and in its technical advisory support from Rome. There may also have been missed opportunities for using FAO tools and frameworks that can assist policy-makers, for example in translating outputs from the food security information system into scenario development and options appraisal tools.

134. Although many parts of the SIFSIA-supported food security information system are technically strong, their impact has been weakened by the fact that there was no SIFSIA communications strategy and little investment in dissemination of information and analysis. For a food security information system that aspires to make the transition from information to

action, a communications strategy must be designed early on and must be adapted to the context. In Sudan, for example, with a strong oral tradition, reliance on electronic communication will have limited impact. Fostering and nurturing debate and discussion and ensuring that as many of the target audience as possible hear and discuss the findings of the information system and of commissioned research are essential.

135. Design and implementation of a food security information system must be contextually-driven. In other words, the starting point for deciding on the priorities for technical assistance and support should be the needs of the country/ government and its capacity rather than the latest technology on offer. This principle was applied to parts of the programme, for example in developing FAMIS, but less so to others, for example in introducing the GIEWS work-station which should have been subject to a much more rigorous feasibility study. The programme has demonstrated the importance of trialling different data collection methods and being prepared to adapt them to the context or abandon those that do not work. As far as possible learning from food security information systems in neighbouring countries should be drawn upon and built upon to ensure that mistakes are not repeated.

10.1.6 Management

136. The FAO(R) has a key role to play when implementing a food security project like SIFSIA within a challenging context. This role should include providing strategic leadership to the project as well as facilitating networking and promoting the project at high political levels within government.

10.2 Generically, for supporting food security 'post-conflict' in challenging contexts

137. The 'post-conflict' or 'post peace agreement' period is often characterized by instability and competing government priorities. Issues of strategic political significance are likely to dominate over longer-term developmental issues. There is a strong case for introducing a programme like the SIFSIA one to strengthen food security capacity within government at such a time, to provide data and analysis to inform decision-making, and even to encourage a more evidence-based approach to decision-making. In order to be relevant it is important that the programme addresses both chronic and acute/ humanitarian food security needs as the latter are likely to continue even after a peace agreement has been signed.

138. To be successful the programme must be flexible and constantly adapting to the changing and evolving context in which it is operating. This is even more essential when informing and influencing policy-making and the government architecture/ institutional set-up for enhancing food security. Such work demands a pragmatic and flexible approach, identifying and seizing opportunities as they arise. In this context an output/ activity-based log-frame model, although popular with donors, is of questionable relevance, especially when it is written in great detail. As the performance of most programmes is measured against the log-frame this tends to encourage rigidity in programme implementation and adherence to outputs which may become outdated by the changing context. It discourages opportunism and adaptability to the changing context. If the log-frame is to continue to be used as the main accountability and monitoring tool, then it must be written in such a way that it encourages qualities of flexibility and adaptability to the changing policy and political context.

11 Recommendations

11.1 *For the final months of the SIFSIA project*

Recommendation 1: To FAO and the PSU, in collaboration with the FSTS

As indicated in this evaluation report, there may be a window of opportunity opening to ratify the Rural Development, Food Security and Poverty Alleviation Act and to establish the Food Security Council with the support of the ARP. This will require high level political engagement and buy-in. Pursuing this should be prioritised by the programme and by the PSU with the support of the FAO Representative.

Recommendation 2: To SIFSIA SC, Director of FSTS and PSU

The current composition of the FSTS must be strengthened in terms of its representation of key sectors that are relevant to food security. The Ministry of Welfare and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance must be encouraged to nominate staff and to play a full role in the work of the FSTS.

Recommendation 3: To PSU

The online information systems that are close to completion but still outstanding must be rapidly finalised so that there is at least a couple of months for them to be tried and tested before the SIFSIA programme ends. This refers to 'FARMER' under FAMIS and the online nutrition information system. Once FARMER is live, the web location of the market information system should be rationalised so that it presents the most up-to-date information and to avoid confusion.²⁴

Recommendation 4: To PSU and FSTS

The embryonic Food Security & Nutrition Working Group must become fully fledged during the final months of the SIFSIA programme, with the PSU's support, to establish its role and credibility as a forum for food security bringing together stakeholders from government, the international community and the private sector. At least one further well-planned and facilitated meeting, with this objective, should be held before the PSU disbands.

Recommendation 5: To FAO and PSU with EU support

A clear strategy for ensuring the continuation and further development of key components of the food security information system that SIFSIA has supported at federal level, that are unlikely to be sustained when Stabex funding is withdrawn, should be drawn up. This includes seeking external funding for activities at federal level that will not be covered by the new food security project, namely the continuation and further development of FAMIS, and the continuation and strengthening of the IPC. It also means ensuring that there is ongoing support to the MoH for the nutrition information system, possibly from UNICEF.

Recommendation 6: To PSU and FSTS with support from FAO-R

SIFSIA and the FSTS must develop a clear communication and dissemination strategy to raise awareness of the components of the food security information system it has strengthened and the data available, of the role of the FSTS, and to build support for the

²⁴ This may mean ending ESOKO

continuation of the work. This needs to be carefully targeted so that it is appropriate for different audiences. Consideration should be given to the following:

- organizing a workshop for the Under-Secretaries of the respective line ministries engaging in the SIFSIA programme in a neighbouring country such as Kenya that has a more developed food security information system, to build support for the work of the FSTS and how it can better link to policy-making
- this could be followed by a high-level workshop in Khartoum that showcases some of SIFSIA's work and ends with high-level government endorsement of the food security information system and how it relates to policy
- raising awareness amongst the international community, on both the humanitarian and development sides, of the food security information and analysis that is available and how it might meet their needs, for example through the FSNWG and by raising the profile of the FSTS and its analysis at FSL cluster meetings. Providing ongoing monitoring and analysis of food security conditions during 2012 is an immediate way of demonstrating the relevance and usefulness of SIFSIA's work

As a priority, design of the FSTS website must be completed so that it becomes an effective portal for all food security information. Raising awareness of the website should be a key part of the communications strategy.

Recommendation 7: To PSU and FAO NRL

The land cover data has become available late in the life of the SIFSIA programme. Raising awareness of the availability of this data should be a part of the communication and dissemination strategy to promote its utilization. Further training should be provided to the FSTS on utilization of the land cover data to consolidate their GIS capabilities. This should be done as Training of Trainers to promote the continued transfer of skills beyond the end of the SIFSIA programme.

Recommendation 8: To FAO Rome

In order to ensure that the new food security project benefits fully from the learning and experience of SIFSIA, some hand-over between the outgoing and incoming CTAs must be planned. Ideally this would happen before the end of the SIFSIA programme. If this is not possible, then ways of ensuring that the CTAs have substantial time together in Khartoum should be planned to ensure transmission of learning and of key contacts and networks

Recommendation 9: To PSU

The SIFSIA-N exit strategy should be revised and tightened to reflect the above priorities. The current update against each output in the log-frame in the draft exit strategy could usefully be included in an annex but does not currently indicate the strategic priorities for the final months of the programme

11.2 In order to sustain the benefits of the SIFSIA project

Recommendation 10: To Government of Sudan

The FSC must be established without delay. At a critical time in Sudan's political and economic development the FSC could play a critical role in overseeing the food security of the country and taking key policy decisions to promote food security. In order to be effective, it requires a high level of political support, must be adequately resourced and representative of the different sectors that are relevant to food security. Once it is established, one of the

first jobs for the FSC is to review and streamline the proposed institutional set-up for food security in Sudan

Recommendation 11: To Government of Sudan

Certain sectors that have been poorly represented so far in the SIFSIA programme should be boosted in future food security data gathering and analysis, in particular the livestock sector and ongoing monitoring of poverty and vulnerability. International support for improved data collection in these sectors should be considered

Recommendation 12: To Government of Sudan

GoS budget commitments for food security for 2012, to fund the FSTS *and* its operating costs must be fully realised as an indication of government's commitment to the SIFSIA programme and to food security

Recommendation 13: To FAO in-country and FAO HQ

As indicated in recommendation no.5, continued international funding and technical support will be required to sustain some key elements of the food security information system that SIFSIA has supported, such as the IPC. FAO has a key role to play beyond the end of the SIFSIA programme to ensure this happens and is successful. FAO should also ensure that links are maintained between the FSTS and the GMFS crop production assessment process. The FAO mission in-country should provide ongoing support to the FSTS after the programme ends, to present its ongoing monitoring and analysis to key fora, such as FSL cluster meetings, which are an opportunity to reach the international community.

Recommendation 14: To Government of Sudan

Other components of the food security information system could be taken a stage further in terms of their development and especially how they link together to form a coherent food security information system. To achieve this would require further international support in terms of funding and technical support. For example, the nutrition information system could be more closely linked to other sources of food security information, including the livelihood zoning.

11.3 For the new food security project

There is valuable learning from the experience of the SIFSIA programme that should be applied during the design and inception phase of the new project, in particular the following:

Recommendation 15: To FAO and EU Delegation

There is a need to secure high-level political buy-in at federal level at the beginning of the project to ensure it gets off to a good start, that adequate government resources are made available, and that there is a strong connection to the FSC (assuming this is established)

Recommendation 16: To FAO HQ

The project must be based on a wide skill-set that covers both the technical and policy-making dimensions of the project. This refers to the skill-set of the technical advisors and the support provided from FAO HQ

Recommendation 17: To FAO

Based on the experience of the SIFSIA programme, recruitment of high calibre national consultants may be a more successful strategy than international recruitment, especially for the state-level technical adviser positions. Such a recruitment strategy would require active head-hunting as well as widespread advertising

Recommendation 18: To FAO

Capacity building at state level should be preceded by a capacity needs assessment. Training should focus on key functions within line ministries which contribute directly to the project outputs/outcomes; training must be tailored to deliver the specific skills set required and as far as possible should be cyclical, on-the-job and supported through training of trainers and regular follow-up. It should also be made clear what outputs are expected from trainees after they have completed a training programme, and the institutional support that will be required for the capacity-building to be effective.

Recommendation 19: To FAO

The food security policy component of the project should be given greater emphasis than has happened in the SIFSIA programme, should be addressed more strategically and be better supported institutionally by FAO through technical assistance with the appropriate skills set. There should be greater investment in analysis that feeds into policy recommendations and in communication and dissemination, including Arabic translation of all documents produced.

Recommendation 20: To FAO and EU

A holistic approach to food security must be promoted, supported by a clear conceptual framework that is widely disseminated from the outset. Greater attention must be paid to the livestock sector than happened in the SIFSIA programme, and to access to food as well as food production. A gender-sensitive approach must be actively promoted and mainstreamed from the outset.

Recommendation 21: To FAO, EU and Government of Sudan)

The project could commence with minimal delay to ensure transfer of learning and experience from the SIFSIA programme and to ensure the incoming technical advisory team benefits fully from the experience, knowledge and networks of the outgoing SIFSIA PSU staff.

Recommendation 22: To FAO, EU and Government of Sudan

The state-focused food security project should be complemented by internationally-funded technical advisory support to federal level, particularly focused on the areas that have been highlighted in recommendation 5 as requiring ongoing support – for FAMIS and the IPC

11.4 A General recommendation

Information systems depend entirely upon the quality of data generated from the field and so the focus of attention must initially be directed towards effective functional specification and building capacity at this level first and work incrementally upwards. Data quality assessments should be built into the information workflow to provide confidence in the products produced or at least information of explicit known knowledge.

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Annex 1. Terms of Reference

Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations



Office of Evaluation
October 2011

"Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action" ***(SIFSIA) 2007-2011***

Terms of Reference for the Project Final Evaluation

1. Background

1.1 The SIFSIA project is to be seen within the framework of the overall objective or development goal of the European Commission's development assistance to the Sudan that is consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development. The EC assistance is based on a multi-track response strategy involving the design of interventions for different timeframes (immediate, medium and long-term) and for different geographic/administrative levels. Among the different initiatives foreseen under the 'Institutional Capacity' chapter of the Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO), SIFSIA is expected to contribute to food security by supporting the strengthening of policy and planning initiatives and of food security and market information systems.

1.2 SIFSIA is a five-year project²⁵ that aims to contribute to food security by supporting policy and planning initiatives on the basis of enhanced information systems. It is a national initiative, and the full implementation of SIFSIA has been entrusted to FAO. Given the different food security situations and related needs and institutional and policy frameworks that existed from the time of the design, the SIFSIA programme has been divided into two sub-programmes: one for the North and one for the South. Both sub-projects have similar objectives and activities, and each one has its own budget and separate implementation arrangements. These ToRs are therefore common for two similar evaluations to be conducted in parallel, for each of the sub-projects. This also reflects one of the basic tenets of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the GoS and the SPLM on 9th of January 2005 that is the *One Country- Two Systems* principle. This is reinforced by the latest political context in the Sudan that the referendum in early 2011 has resulted in the succession of the South from the North by July 2011. Given the context, the final evaluation will be done in the context of two complementary projects funded by the EU in two neighbouring countries.

1.3 SIFSIA was signed by the Government of Sudan (National Authorising Officer, NAO), EC and FAO on 5 October 2006. In accordance with the Contribution Agreement (CA) and

²⁵ Initially the project was of a four year duration. In June 2010, a no cost extension and budget revision was approved, extending the project for 12 months.

the first amendment to the CA, the implementation of the project commenced on 1 December 2006²⁶, and the revised end date of the project is 30 November 2011. A mid-term evaluation was undertaken between October-November 2009 and lessons drawn and recommendations for the second phase of the project provided (see summary, Annex 1). A final evaluation was foreseen in the project document to take place in order to review the programme implementation following the OECD DAC criteria and recommendations on the future of food security information in the Sudan, and the adequate transfer from SIFSIA management functions to the Sudanese institutions.

1.4 The external funding of SIFSIA amounts to EUR 20.6 million, of which EUR 20 million is financed by the European Commission (Stabex funds). The funding is equally divided between North and South. In addition, the project foresaw substantial contributions (in kind) by the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan.

1.5 The overall objective of SIFSIA is to assist the respective national authorities to build up necessary institutional and human capacity to be able to address the current disconnect between policy, programming and planning on one hand, and food security information and analysis on the other. Establishment of internal capacity to collect and process information to enable national authorities to ensure a comprehensive and relevant set of responses for addressing food insecurity in a sustainable manner is key to the project strategy. This in turn will contribute to the achievement of MDG#1, reduced poverty and hunger. As described in the project document, key desired results of SIFSIA should include: human, physical and organisational capacities strengthened in the generation and utilisation of information for the analysis, design, monitoring and evaluation of food security related policies and programmes. SIFSIA objectives are:

- Overall policy framework for food security defined and operational.
- Institutional set-up for food security established and functioning to enhance coordination and strengthen vertical and horizontal linkages.
- Effective policies and programmes designed, monitored, evaluated and updated for: (i) rehabilitation and strengthening smallholders' livelihoods; (ii) managing natural resources in a sustainable and equitable manner; (iii) protecting the vulnerable; and (iv) monitoring relevant MDG and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper indicators.
- Relevant food security information easily accessed and used by all relevant stakeholders.

1.6 The project foresaw the revision of the SIFSIA logical framework through a participatory exercise (Annex 2). This took place in September 2008 for South Sudan sub-programme, and October 2008 for North Sudan sub-programme. The revised comprehensive logframe took into account the views of major stakeholders and the specific context in the Sudan (both North and South). The exercise also supported the development of a monitoring and evaluation framework (performance measurement plan) as well as recommend template/formats for performance reporting.

1.7 The Mid Term Evaluation assessed project performance at midpoint and made specific recommendations for the duration of the project. The main conclusions and recommendations are annexed to the TOR.

²⁶ Programme activities started de facto with arrival of international staff (March 2007 in North Sudan and May 2007 in South Sudan)

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

2.1 The overall purpose of this final evaluation is to review project delivery of the expected outputs and provide decision makers in the Governments (GNU and GoSS), and the European Commission with sufficient information to make an informed judgement about the performance of the project (its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact), make decisions about future related interventions and the future of food security information in North and South Sudan, acknowledging the recent division into two separate States.

2.2 In addition, the evaluation is an opportunity to learn from this experience in order to improve the design and implementation of similar interventions in the future that aim to improve food security information systems in countries, in the use at national level of the food security information systems and how these in turn contribute to improved decision-making. For this reason, it is expected that the evaluation findings will lead to conclusions and recommendations useful for future normative, operational and organization strategies for information systems for food and nutrition security²⁷.

3. Scope of the Evaluation

3.1 The final evaluation will evaluate FAO's performance during the project throughout all phases from formulation to handover but with a particular focus on results since the mid-term evaluation. This evaluation, will have as a reference point the original project log frames but will base itself on the revised log frame.

3.2. The independent evaluation will assess the overall results of the programme and analyze them against the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. The evaluation should be seen as being both evaluative and formative.

3.3 For the purposes of the evaluation, the definition of **food security** used is that promoted by FAO as originally defined at the World Food Summit 1996 and framed within a multisectoral causal model that identifies food availability, access, utilization and stability as underlying domains related to food security. *"Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life."*

3.4 The evaluation defines an **information system for food and nutrition security** as: *"a group of interrelated activities typically including data generation, data cleaning and processing, data analysis, data storage and retrieval, and communication and dissemination, which are brought together as a whole."* Common functions of such a system are baseline vulnerability and poverty assessments, early warning, needs assessments, programme

²⁷ FAO currently has a draft corporate strategy on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security/ISFNS under development.

monitoring and impact evaluation.²⁸ The SIFSIA project provides inputs to specific parts of this system and on several levels: providing normative and technical support in the form of tools, methods, standards; engaging in capacity building of individuals and institutions; and supporting the analytical linkages between FSN information and analysis and decision/policy making in the form of research, policy analysis and advice. The results indicators of interest to the evaluation will be related to the utilization of the generated FSN information and analysis (outcomes) by both public²⁹ and private sector actors - and the extent to which programmes and policies have been influenced and improved by such inputs (impact) in terms of resource allocations, increased visibility of food security within high level strategic frameworks and policies, institutional capacity developed, and increased inter-sectoral collaboration in tackling food insecurity and malnutrition. The longer term development goal of improved food security at population level is considered relevant to programme but measurement and the assessment of the SIFSIA programmes' contribution to any changes in goal level indicators is likely to be problematic given the relatively short timeframe of the project and plethora of other factors that also have influence on these development indicators.

3.5 Audience and potential users of the evaluation include mainly governmental authorities in both North (GNU) and South Sudan (GoSS) and the European Commission as well as FAO management and programme staff at country level as well as relevant FAO technical and management staff at Headquarters. The final evaluation will address specific issues in relation to the Organization's functional relationships with: (i) the GNU and GoSS; (ii) the different ministries (Agriculture & Forestry, International Cooperation, Finance & National Economy, Animal Resources & Fisheries, Irrigation, Social Welfare, and Health) in both North (GNU) and South (GoSS); (iii) other relevant institutions such as the Sudan Meteorological Authority (SMA), the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the South Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, (iv) the European Union and (v) other food security information user stakeholders including UN agencies, donors and non-government organizations.

4. Key issues/key evaluation questions

4.1. The evaluation analysis will be developed around the OECD criteria as presented below, and will build on the work carried out in the Mid-Term evaluation and the key conclusions of previous evaluations³⁰. An initial list of key sub questions has been identified through discussions with project stakeholders. The evaluation team may identify other issues in the course of evaluation.

4.2 Relevance

- a) Relevance and coherence of the SIFSIA programme to development priorities and needs. This includes the development of priorities and needs of both Governments (GNU and GoSS). Special attention will be given to the rapidly changing context in Sudan including the

²⁸ Humanitarian Information Systems and Emergencies in the Greater Horn of Africa: Logical Components and Logical Linkages. Daniel Maxwell and Ben Watkins. Disasters, 2003, 27(1): 72-90.

²⁹ Including GoNU and GoSS and resource partners (development and humanitarian)

³⁰ SIFSIA Mid Term Evaluation, the global evaluation of FAO and WFPs Work in ISFNS, as well as the 2004-2009 Sudan Country Evaluation

relevance of the current institutional set up for the future given the succession of South Sudan during 2011.

- b) Clarity and realism of each of the sub-programme's development and immediate objectives, including specification of targets and identification of institutional beneficiaries and prospects for sustainability.(the mission will examine in greater detail the revised project logframe which has been the basis for project implementation since late 2008).
- c) Quality, clarity and adequacy of each of the sub-programme design and implementation including:
 - clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and final achievement of objectives (quality, quantity and time-frame); appropriateness of the designed coverage of the project (national, state)
 - realism and clarity in the specification of prior obligations and prerequisites (assumptions and risks) and adequacy of resources (time, funding, human resources) for the successful implementation of the project;
 - clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan;
 - likely cost-effectiveness of the programme design;
 - adequacy and appropriateness of the technical solutions proposed (level of sophistication of systems, equipments, proposed institutional set-up, etc) with respect to the existing (or expected) capacities in both GNU and GoSS institutions expected to take over them.

4.3 Efficiency

- d) Efficiency and adequacy of programme implementation including: solutions proposed; use of resources; timely and cost effective start up of the project; the quality and timeliness of input delivery by both FAO and the Government; managerial and work efficiency; appropriateness of technical assistance provided at the country level; technical backstopping from HQ; operational support from HQ; implementation difficulties; adequacy of monitoring and reporting; the extent of national support and commitment and the quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO.
- e) Stakeholder participation in the design, management and implementation of the project, and the level of local ownership. Assessment of the programme management structure and coordination arrangements in North and South (North and South Steering Committees, Technical Committee (only existing in the South), Programme Support Units, etc.), and the extent to which timely and appropriate decisions have been made to support effective implementation and problem resolution.

4.4 Effectiveness

- f) Project effectiveness and results, including a full and systematic assessment of all expected outcomes under the project (quantity and quality towards achieving the immediate objectives). The main focus at the end of the project is to evaluate to what extent individual, organizational and institutional capacity has been developed both to collect/analyze and appropriately use food and nutrition information for decision-making.
- g) Quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders were kept adequately informed of project activities.
- h) Coverage of the information that was generated and disseminated (sectoral coverage, geographic coverage of the most vulnerable groups, etc) and systems in place.

4.5 Connectedness/Sustainability

- i) The prospects for sustaining the programme's results by the host institutions in GNU and GoSS at the termination of the project. The mission should examine financial viability/recurrent cost financing, equipment/asset maintenance, institutional capacity building and local ownership, etc of the main sub-programmes components, in particular (to be specified):
 - the institutional set up for Food Security
 - the information systems
- j) "Value added to European Community development objectives and programmes" will be evaluated with respect to the extent to which EU funding for the SIFSIA project complements funding and support provided by the EU for other programmes in Sudan. In particular, linkages between the SIFSIA and EU funded SPCR project and synergies with the global EC/FAO Food Security Information for Action Programme, as well as synergies with the global partnership in general between the EU and FAO, will be examined.
- k) Analysis of how gender issues were mainstreamed, including strategic and practical gender needs, in the objectives, design, identification of final beneficiaries and implementation of the entity being evaluated. This will include an analysis of gender equity in the management and staffing of the entity.
- l) The evaluation should consider what, if any, of the normative products³¹ introduced during the course of the project have been appropriated that may have enduring benefit after project activities cease.

4.6 Impact

Analysis of the results of the project in north and south Sudan, especially with regard to: (i) the extent food security information produced by FAO (directly and in collaboration with partners) has informed/been used for decision-making and other purposes; and (ii) the extent to which such uses have the potential to contribute to reducing hunger and eliminating poverty in Sudan.

4.7 Lessons Learned

³¹ Guidelines, tools, standards, methodologies, publications, etc.

- m) Analysis of lessons learned in the design and implementation of projects that have aimed to improve food security information systems in Sudan, in the use at national and sub-national levels of the food security information and analysis and how these in turn contribute to improved decision-making.
- n) In the context of the new food security policy directions³² in North and South Sudan, what lessons learned can be drawn upon to increase impact, effectiveness and sustainability of food security information systems.

5. Evaluation design/Methodology

5.1. FAO Independent Office of Evaluation will manage this evaluation in full transparency, while ensuring that it remains completely independent and external to the project management. The FAO Representative and the EU Delegation will take responsibility for liaising with the NAO, Project Steering Committees and relevant stakeholders for all aspects related to information about the evaluation. The evaluation team, once in country, will be facilitated by FAO for administrative issues but will conduct its work independently.

5.2 The evaluation methodology will be consultative and will draw upon the views and perspectives of Government(s), FAO and EC staff at country level, data and documentation reviews, and interviews with key decision maker and partner stakeholders working in the area of food security. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that women and other underprivileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner. The evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards.

5.3 While ultimate beneficiaries of the programme are households vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition, for the purposes of this evaluation, the primary beneficiaries are considered to be decision makers dealing with food security policy and programming in both GNU and GoSS. Other beneficiaries are the international community (donors, UN, NGOs), private sector and local organizations dealing with food security issues either in emergency or in longer term development contexts.

5.4 The achievement of the tasks described above, will require the use of the following evaluation methods and tools: (i) Desk Review: Review of literature of project related materials as well as contextual information (an analysis of food security situation and trends over the past decade should be undertaken) ; (ii) preparation of an evaluation matrix with related evaluation questions and benchmarks; (iii) Stakeholder Review; (iv) Semi-structured interviews at field level in North and South Sudan; and (v) End-of-mission workshops in the field (Khartoum and Juba) to discuss and validate findings, and explore possible recommendations. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework³³ as the reference for assessing contributions to poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, social, economic and environmental sustainability and the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework for assessment of project/programme results may also be used as an analytical tool.

³² At present, the EU is considering to extend the support to SIFSIA related areas of work (capacity development for food security information systems and decision making) with a new intervention focusing at the State level.

³³ The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial, and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in particular of the poor. For more information, among others: http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf

5.2. Phases and Deliverables

| | |
|--|--|
| July-Sept 2011 | Finalization of the TOR in consultation with the EU and PSCs. Briefing Team Leader by LTU, PTF and OED in FAO (Rome) Preparation of evaluation matrix and tools |
| 6-27 November 2011 | Briefing team in Khartoum and Juba Field mission Presentation of initial findings, conclusions and recommendations in Juba and Khartoum |
| December 2011 January 2012 February 2012 | Draft report prepared and circulated for review to FAO and PSC N/S members. Feedback provided to Team Leader, report finalized. Management response (by FAO, EU and PSC) to recommendations. Report and MR in the public domain. |

6. Composition of the Mission

6.1 Under the responsibility of the Independent Office of Evaluation of FAO, the evaluation team will be composed of a Team Leader and 4 other team members .

The Team Leader will be an independent *professional evaluator* with experience in leading large complex evaluations and a solid understanding of FSIS work. He/she will have a postgraduate qualification in a discipline relevant to the assignment, with a minimum of 15 years work experience. Experience in the evaluation of technical assistance programmes, preferably EC-funded, is particularly relevant, as well as proven capacity in working with institutions at different levels. The Team Leader will have overall responsibility for leading the team, preparing the evaluation matrix, coordinating the team members' inputs, writing the report for the north Sudan component and preparing a synthesis of the two (N/S) evaluation reports comparing and contrasting results and drawing common conclusions and recommendations. Excellent report writing skills are a requirement.

S/he will be seconded by a national consultant with expertise in the area of capacity building and institutional development in northern Sudan.

A third consultant will be recruited to be the senior evaluator to lead the team in South Sudan. The consultant will have expertise in FSIS tools and methods and will be seconded by a national consultant with expertise in the area of capacity building and institutional development in southern Sudan. The senior evaluator will be responsible for the delivery of a complete evaluation report for the South Sudan component of SIFSIA.

A fifth consultant will be recruited with expertise in statistics, data management, remote sensing and other technologies relevant to the SIFSIA project. He will divide his time equally during the mission between north and south Sudan.

6.2 The evaluation team overall is also required to have the following qualifications and expertise:

- Familiarity with the on-going political processes and developments in both North and South Sudan.
- Familiarity with the political, socio-economic and institutional conditions in the Sudan in general.
- Sensitivity to socio-cultural and gender issues.
- Proven practical experience in programme evaluation, including proven expertise in facilitating different types of consultative, evaluative workshops for comparable organizations, including more complex exercises/workshops involving a range of organizations and participants.
- Ability to analyse and synthesise information, and to write clear reports.
- Fluency in English is required. Arabic would be a distinct advantage.

Two sub-teams, each comprised of one FSIS expert and one capacity building and institutional strengthening expert, will be deployed to north and south Sudan respectively. Each sub-team will be required to submit a full report covering the criteria and key questions outlined above. The two evaluation team leaders, assisted by the respective team members, will lead the presentation of each of the reports to the two different Project Steering Committees in Khartoum and Juba, presenting preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations. Each of the Steering Committees will also receive a brief presentation of the findings of the other sub-programme evaluation report.

More specifically, team members will be responsible for:

- a. Ensuring that s/he is fully briefed on the evaluation and has read all key related documentation.
- b. Participating in the Sudan mission, collecting and analysing information, identifying findings and drawing conclusions.
- c. Contributing in a timely manner to the preparation of the respective final evaluation report together with the other core team members and the development of recommendations, in a format and maximum length established by the evaluation management.

6.3 As members of the United Nation Evaluation Group, FAO is committed to the norms and standards of 2005 as well as to the ethical guidelines for evaluation published in 2007. It is therefore expected that evaluators employed by FAO apply and/or ensure high professional standards in line with UN Evaluation Norms & Standards and Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System. All team members will be asked to sign a Declaration of Interest, aimed at ensuring that evaluation consultants do not have a conflict of interest with regard to the programmes that they are evaluating.

6.4 The mission will maintain close liaison with the Representatives of the EC, FAO and concerned Government counterparts, as well as with national and international project staff. Although the mission should feel free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant

to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor, or FAO.

6.5. It is understood that Sudan is considered a hardship country and that travel under difficult conditions will occur and specific security precautions are in place.

6.6. The Evaluation Manager from FAO's Independent Evaluation Service will oversee the management of the evaluation process to ensure that the evaluation proceeds smoothly and adheres to acceptable evaluation norms and standards.

7. Reporting

7.1 The mission is fully responsible for its independent reporting which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government, the donor or FAO. The reports will be written in conformity with the headings and length indicated in Annex 3.

7.2 The evaluation team, lead by the team leader will prepare two **draft evaluation reports**, one for each of the sub-programmes, in accordance with formats to be provided by the FAO Office of Evaluation (OE). In addition, the Team Leader will prepare a brief 2-3 page consolidated synthesis highlighting the main findings of each report. The draft report will be completed, to the extent possible, in the country and the findings and recommendations fully discussed with all concerned parties during a presentation prior to the departure of the mission.

7.3 Each draft report will be presented by the Team leader to the respective Steering Committee in two workshops, to be organised in Juba and Khartoum prior to the departure of the team from Sudan. Members of the Steering Committees should receive the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations before the workshop, so that they can provide informed comments at the workshop. An aide memoir of the feedback session will be prepared.

7.4 The Team Leader will incorporate comments received from stakeholders as appropriate and prepare an independent **Final Evaluation Report**, which will include the brief synthesis as well as the two separate reports for each sub-programme, including conclusions and recommendations for the future of food security information work in North and South Sudan, acknowledging the division into two separate States. The final report will be submitted to the OE within one month of the completion of the mission. OE is responsible for evaluation quality assurance and will clear the report within a maximum period of 14 days, after ensuring that it adequately adheres to the terms of reference, is complete and conforms to UN evaluation standards. OE will be then responsible to formally disseminate the report to FAO, the EU and NAO and to the members of both (North and South) SIFSIA Steering Committees on behalf of the Evaluation Team.

8.4 After the report has been finalised, to improve the utilization of the evaluation report, a management response will be required from FAO, the EU or the PSC on the findings and recommendations as relevant stating those it accepts and those it rejects and why, and a proposed operational plan on how it intends to follow-up in its future programme developments. This management response should be sent to OE within one month of the finalization of the report. Both the final evaluation report and the management response are considered public documents.


SIFSIA is an important and courageous programme in difficult circumstances. What it is trying to achieve is highly relevant to both Northern and Southern Sudan. In the north, its progress has been disappointing in phase one, but this is partly to do with a persistent but distracting focus on institutional changes that were beyond the control of the programme staff. It has made progress in other areas of food security monitoring and analysis, but these are fragmented and do not yet contribute to a stronger overall approach to food security analysis and decision-making. Reorientation and reinvigoration is essential in phase 2 to build on the work that has been done so far, and to make a difference. SIFSIA-S is a more coherent sub-programme and is working in a more conducive institutional context. It has started to lay the foundations for long-term food security monitoring, analysis and decision-making, but it too needs some reorientation to encourage a holistic approach to food security, and a sharpening of its strategic focus to have maximum impact in an environment where the capacity-building needs can be overwhelming.

The following recommendations are common to both sub-programmes. For detailed recommendations that relate to each, see the separate MTE reports on SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S

1. The MTE recommends that the timeframe for phase 2 for both sub-programmes be extended from two to four years, to the end of 2012. This gives a greater chance of achieving SIFSIA's objectives and of ensuring that systems are well-established in both GNU and GOSS by the time the programme ends. The financial commitments of both GNU and GOSS should gradually be increased during phase 2, and managed transparently. Both SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S should prepare clear strategies for phase 2, including a budget revision (taking into account SPCRFP funding for state-level capacity-building, and the recommendations for phase 2 from this MTE) which will indicate whether additional donor funding will be required. However, there should also be a contingency plan in case no further donor funding is forthcoming.
2. Both SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S should re-orientate their approach to pay more attention to capacity-building at state level in phase 2, for three reasons: first, because this is the source of food security information for GNU and GOSS and this is the way to maximise complementarity with projects like SPCRFP; second, it fits with Sudan's policy of decentralisation; third, in northern Sudan there may be greater scope for promoting a multi-sectoral approach to food security at state rather than federal level. Although some capacity-building activities can cover all states, there needs to be a focused approach on a few states for maximum sustainability.
3. Both SIFSIA sub-programmes have tended to concentrate on production aspects of food security in phase 1. This must be redressed in phase 2 with more attention paid to issues of access, especially to issues of poverty and vulnerability. When the results of the forthcoming HIES are available, this will be a valuable opportunity to re-assess issues of poverty and food insecurity across Sudan, creating an opportunity for joint analysis by SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S. It will also be an opportunity to review issues of urban poverty that are currently poorly understood.

4. Policy analysis to strengthen decision-making should be a more prominent part of the sub-programmes of both SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S in phase 2. This will require more short-term inputs on issues of strategic significance, from ESA and from consultants. And it will be important for SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S to identify areas of common interest and ways of promoting coherence.
5. Capacity-building, especially training, has been the core of what both sub-programmes have achieved in phase 1. While this should continue, the approach should be sharpened in phase 2, to ensure that all capacity-building activities are strategically designed and organised, that there is adequate follow-up, and that training activities are more closely related to performance and output of the respective trainees and their organisations.
6. Greater attention should be paid to the Three Areas in phase 2, in terms of food security monitoring and support to government officers. These areas are particularly fragile, and this is where both sub-programmes working across the political divide could really add value.
7. The collaboration between SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S should be strengthened, to be more strategic and to ensure coherence in approach. This particularly relates to the nature of engagement between the two PSUs, for example closely working together when they are formulating their strategies and workplans. Links between the respective SCs should also be strengthened, by one SC member attending the other's SC meetings, and members of the PSU making occasional presentations to the other SC on issues of mutual interest where there is potential learning. It is also recommended that SIFSIA-N and S have one team managing both sub-programmes within TCES.
8. Quarterly tripartite meetings should be held between the SPCR and SIFSIA Steering Committee chairs, FAOR and EC (as proposed in the FAO High Level Mission Aide Memoire of November 2008). This should help to 'institutionalize' a more involved and supportive role by FAOR, enable greater engagement by the EC Delegation, and strengthen the collaboration and potential synergy between SIFSIA-N and SPCR.
9. The forthcoming FAO evaluation of its entire Sudan programme should review FAO's management arrangements for SIFSIA (and other FAO development programmes in Sudan, including SPCR) and recommend the most efficient and practical way of managing these programmes in future.

[Terms of Reference] Annex 2: General Logic Model for the SIFSIA Project



[Note: Terms of Reference Annex 3 omitted.]

[Terms of Reference] Annex 4: Basic Evaluation Reference Material

General:

- Project document, contract and amendment
- Inception Report
- PSC Minutes
- Mid Term Independent Evaluation Report 2009

Specific South:

- Work plan for year 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
- Annual report
- Financial reports
- Quarterly progress reports

Specific North:

- Work plan for year 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
- Annual report
- Financial reports
- Quarterly progress reports

All SIFSIA project outputs to date

Technical Backstopping (BTOR) Reports

SPCRP Project Document

EC/FAO Food Security Information for Action Project Document

FAO Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security – Draft Strategy

Background Material:

- EIU Country Brief Sudan 2010

Annex 2. Evaluation Matrix for SIFSIA Final Evaluation

| <i>Question and sub-questions</i> | <i>Potential sources</i> | <i>Question relevant to:</i> |
|--|---|---|
| Relevance | | (see list of categories below. NB this is indicative are many questions are relevant to all categories of interviewees) |
| 1. How relevant is the SIFSIA programme: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> to the needs and development priorities of the governments of Sudan and ROSS in view of the changing context and secession of South Sudan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Background documents on the context, and especially analyses of the changing context and issues arising with secession Government documents/ strategies/ plans that indicate government priorities Interviews with high level government officers, aid policy-makers etc Feedback from Project Steering Committees | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> All, especially 2, 5 and 6 (government ministers and senior civil servants) |
| 2. How clear and realistic were the objectives of SIFSIA and its design, including: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> how clear and realistic were the targets? how clear and realistic was identification of institutional beneficiaries? assumptions & risks including about the adequacy of resources how clear and realistic were the prospects for sustainability? how were the findings and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation taken on board? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key project documents eg formulation & inception documents, annual reports Mid-term evaluation and management response Interviews with all key stakeholders ie SIFSIA staff, FAO, EC, government) Interviews with others running food security information systems and capacity-building programmes with govt | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> All, especially 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9, and EC |
| NB This will build on the analysis from the mid-term evaluation | | |
| 3. How clear and realistic has the implementation of the SIFSIA sub-programmes been in terms of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> the appropriateness of the managerial and institutional framework for implementation external institutional relationships the adequacy and appropriateness of the technical solutions proposed with respect to existing capacities, and the appropriateness of the technical assistance provided | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of planning documents (project formulation document, inception report, log-frame) Mid-term evaluation Interviews with key informants in key ministries and selected international agencies Interviews with PSU staff Interviews with government staff who participated in SIFSIA capacity-building | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> All especially 1, 2, 3,4, 9 |

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of capacity assessments • Assessment of technical inputs against capacity assessments | |
| Efficiency and effectiveness | | |
| 4. How clear and logically consistent are the links between inputs, activities, outputs and the final achievement of objectives? To what extent did these change after the mid-term evaluation? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Log-frame • Annual reports • Mid-term evaluation • Management response to mid-term evaluation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1 |
| 5. How cost-effective and timely has implementation been, with a specific focus on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) the efficient use of resources (technical – in the project team, and from FAO HQ; financial; equipment etc) b) the timeliness of inputs c) the timeliness of decision-making | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief analysis of SIFSIA project expenditure • Timelines of project implementation • Annual reports • ‘Back to office reports’ • Interviews with PSU staff and with Project Steering Committees | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2 and 9 |
| 6. How effective has the programme been in delivering its outcomes, particularly in terms of how individual, organizational and institutional capacity has been developed both to collect/analyze and appropriately use food and nutrition information for decision-making. Where this has not been achieved, what have been the reasons? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documents and progress reports • Interviews with key stakeholders, including PSU staff (possibly in a workshop format) • Interviews with government officers who benefitted from SIFSIA capacity-building: national and state levels | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
| 7. What is the quality of information management and reporting, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) quality of information collection b) quality of information analysis c) quality of presentation and dissemination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of information management systems and outputs • Review of distribution lists • Interviews with actual and potential users (national level, state level, international agencies) • Interviews with others running food security information systems in Sudan and in ROSS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 8 |
| 8. To what extent have gender issues been mainstreamed, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) gender analysis of food insecurity b) attention to gender and gender equity in SIFSIA’s activities, including its capacity-building activities c) the gender balance in the management and staffing of SIFSIA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of gender sensitivity in technical inputs and in SIFSIA outputs • Review of gender sensitivity of training materials, where possible • Assessment of gender balance amongst government beneficiaries of SIFSIA (national and state levels) • Review of PSU staffing structures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 3 and 4 |

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| <p>9. How efficient and effective have the management arrangements been for SIFSIA, particularly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) within the PSU b) within FAO c) within government, through the Project Steering Committees d) between FAO and the PSCs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with key stakeholders: PSU, Project Steering Committees members, FAO HQ, EC) • Project documents • Evidence of how decisions have been taken/ blocked, and speed of execution • Review of reporting requirements and quality of reporting | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 9 and EC |
| Coverage | | |
| <p>10. How appropriate is the coverage of SIFSIA, in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) national versus state level b) geographically c) sectorally d) in terms of vulnerable groups, covering access to food as well as food production e) chronic versus acute food insecurity (long-term vs humanitarian) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documents • Mid-term evaluation • Interviews with PSU • Interviews with others tracking food insecurity and working with different food insecure groups and in different geographic areas eg NGOs etc • Interviews with actual and potential users – government and international agencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and EC |
| Connectedness/ Sustainability | | |
| <p>11. What is the depth of local ownership of SIFSIA and to what extent has this been fostered by stakeholder participation in management and implementation of the project?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussions with Project Steering Committees, and follow-up interviews with individual members • Discussions with government ministers and with senior civil servants | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 |
| <p>12. What are the prospects for the sustainability of SIFSIA's work when the project ends, particularly in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) financial sustainability b) human resources c) maintaining equipment and assets d) institutional sustainability (including the institutional set-up) e) sustaining the information systems | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of the respective government's financial contribution so far, and evidence of financial provision in future budgets • Interviews with PSU • Interviews with government officers – state and national level, especially in Ministry of Finance • Interviews with others engaged in capacity-building with government | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
| <p>13. Which of the normative products introduced by SIFSIA may have enduring benefit when the project ends and why? Which are less likely to, and why?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with Ministers, senior civil servants and technical officers within government • References made to SIFSIA products in | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 |

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| | interviews | |
| 14. What are the complementarities and synergies between SIFSIA and other related projects, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) SPCRP (implemented by FAO and funded by EC) b) EC/ FAO's 'Food Security Information for Action Programme' c) other food security information systems and initiatives operating in Sudan and in South Sudan d) in terms of the global partnership between the EU and FAO | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documents on SPCRP, FSIA , EU/ FAO global partnership • Interviews with staff of SPCRP, FSIA • Interviews with staff and funders of other food security projects and initiatives • Interviews with EC and FAO HQ staff | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 8, 9, EC. SPCRP staff |
| Impact/ outcomes | | |
| 15. What has been the impact/ outcomes of the project in terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) the extent to which the food security information produced by the project has informed/ been used for decision-making and other purposes, and its relevance to actual and potential users? b) the extent to which such uses have the potential to contribute to reducing hunger and eliminating poverty in Sudan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of documents in which SIFSIA information is referenced • Interviews with current and potential users of food security information – national and state levels, international community • Policy and other analytical/ evaluative documents on food security and on food security indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 |

NOTE:

In answering these questions, reference will be made to the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation (MTE), their relevance, and the extent to which they were acted upon

Main categories of interviewees

- 1) SIFSIA project staff
- 2) Steering Committee collectively and individual members
- 3) National level government officers who have benefited from capacity-building activities of SIFSIA
- 4) State level government officers who have benefitted from capacity-building activities of SIFSIA
- 5) Potential & actual users of food security information generated by SIFSIA and with SIFSIA support – national level
- 6) Potential & actual users of food security information generated by SIFSIA and with SIFSIA support – state level
- 7) Potential & actual users of food security information generated by SIFSIA and with SIFSIA support – international agencies
- 8) Other information systems (eg VAM, FEWSNet, NGOs etc)
- 9) FAO HQ staff involved with SIFSIA

7th November 2011

Annex 3. List of Persons Interviewed During the Final Evaluation

| S. No | NAME | INSTITUTION |
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| SIFSIA PSU | | |
| 1 | Alemu Asfaw | CTA/SIFSIA |
| 2 | Yahya Awad | SIFSIA |
| 3 | Al Sadig Ibrahim | SIFSIA |
| 4 | Prof. Hamid Mekki | Policy advisor/ consultant to SIFSIA |
| GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN – federal level | | |
| 5 | MoAF | |
| 6 | Mohammed Hassan Jubara | Acting Permanent Secretary & SC Chairman |
| 7 | Nabeel Ahmed Saad | Director-General of Directorate of Planning and Agricultural Economics Department |
| 8 | Azhari Mahgoub Farah | Agricultural Statistics Department |
| | MoARF | |
| 9 | Dr Kamal Tag Elsir Elsheikh | Director -General of the General Directorate of Planning and Animal Resources Economics |
| 10 | Aisha Hussein Hassan Al Dirani | Director of Economics |
| | MIC | |
| 11 | Abd Al Aatti Jabir El Haj | Deputy Director/ Deputy NAO and member of SC |
| | MoIWR | |
| 12 | Karori Elhag Ahamed | Director of Planning |
| | MOH-NNP | |
| 13 | Salwa Sorkati & team | Director of Nutrition Department |
| 14 | Ihsan Ahmed Hassan | National Consultant |
| 15 | Amira Almuneer | Information Unit |
| 16 | Hana Gabir | Monthly Reporting follow-up |
| 17 | Rania Ahmed Daoud | M&E supervision |
| | FNC | |
| 18 | Abdalla Gafar | Technical Sector Manager |
| 19 | Esmat Hassan Abdalla | Director of Forest Management and Inventory Admin Forests National Corp |
| 20 | Osman Omer Abd Alla | FNC Director, General Planning Administration |
| 21 | Hanadi Awadalla | FNC Extension Manager, Biomass Energy conservation activities |
| 22 | Hiba Ahmed Elnout | FNC Biomass Energy & Renewable energy |
| 23 | Salah Yousif Mohamed | FNC Forest Resource Assessment |
| 24 | Samia Mando | GIS & RS Administration |
| | Strategic Reserve Corporation | |
| 25 | Ibrahim Al Bashier Ahmed | Director General |
| 26 | Abd Al Salaam Hassan | Planning Director |
| 27 | Khalid Omer Ahmed | Executive Director |

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| 28 | Abd Allah Ibrahim | Director - Planning and Research |
| 29 | Ibrahim Al Bashier Ahmed | SRCo |
| | Central Bureau of Statistics | |
| 30 | AL Naeem Suleiman Abbass | National Consultant |
| 31 | Mustafa Hassan Ali | Deputy Director |
| 32 | Al Taj Awad Abu Rass | External Trade Section Manager |
| 33 | Al Sirr Hassan Abbass | Technical Office Manager |
| | Ministry of Social Welfare and Social Security | |
| 34 | Mouda Ibrahim AL Sheikh | Poverty Unit Coordinator |
| 35 | Jamal El Neil Abdallah | Poverty Unit Director |
| 36 | Seif el Dien Abdel Rahim | Deputy Director of Poverty Unit |
| 37 | Manal Sheikh El Dien Hassan | Poverty Unit Information Coordinator |
| 38 | Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim | National Consultant |
| | SMA | |
| 39 | Elsayed Durman Kafi | Director-General, Directorate of Observation and Forecasting |
| 40 | Ismail Fadl El Mouda | Director-General, Administration of Research, Training & Information |
| 41 | Fatima Yahya | Director of Engineering |
| 42 | Ahmed M. Abdelkarim | Director of Planning, Marketing & Investment |
| 43 | S.H. Idris | Director of International Relations |
| 44 | Hanan Awad Mohamed | Head of Agro-meteorology section |
| 45 | Ammar Mokhtar Gomaha | Agro-meteorologist – Agromet Section |
| | HAC | |
| 46 | Yasser Mohammed Hashim | Director of Early Warning Centre |
| 47 | Mu'ataz Ibrahim Ahmed | Director of Humanitarian Aid Department |
| 48 | Budral Dein Abdella Mohammed | Director of General Department of Emergency |
| 49 | Hafsa Abdelbagi Ahmed | Early Warning Centre |
| | Ministry of Finance | |
| 50 | Ebtisam Hassan | Poverty Unit |
| | Agricultural Revival Programme | |
| 51 | Prof. Ahmed Ali Gineif | Adviser, ARP |
| 52 | Eng. Abdul Gabber Hussein | Secretary-General, ARP |
| | FSTS | |
| 53 | Abd Al Haliem Al Hassan | FSTS Director (MOAF) |
| 54 | Fatima Abd Al Aziz | FSTS (MOH) |
| 55 | Ali Ibrahim Al Khalil | Policies/MoA |
| 56 | Fatima Al Hassan Al Tahir | FSTS |
| 57 | Ameira Abdel Rahim | FSTS |
| 58 | Ibrahim Al Shahir | FSTS |
| 59 | Nawal Sayyied Ahmed Zain Al Abdeen | FSTS |
| 60 | Ilham El Sadig Ahmed | FSTS |
| 61 | Siham Mukhtar Al Mardhi | FSTS |
| 62 | Eng. Babikir Haj Hassan | FSTS |

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| 63 | Dr. Farah Idriss | FSTS |
| 64 | Ageeb Mohammed Medani | FSTS |
| 65 | Hamza Surur | FSTS |
| 66 | Nora Abdrahie Khojaly | (IT and GIS) (MOAI) |
| | RSA | |
| 67 | Mohamed Osman | RSA |
| 68 | Hamid | RSA researcher |
| | | |
| | SIFSIA Steering Committee (meeting participants) | |
| 69 | Mohammed Hassan Jubara | Acting PS,MOA |
| 70 | Abdul Aatti Gabir Al Haj | MIC |
| 71 | Selma Yousif Shalwani | MIC |
| 72 | Babikir Haj Ali | FSTS |
| 73 | Abdul Haliem Al Hassan | Head/FSTS |
| 74 | Salah El Dien Muddathir Ahmed | FAO |
| 75 | Mahmoud Hussein Nu'aman | SPCRP/FAO |
| 76 | Sulafa Gaeilly | MIC |
| 77 | Fatima Abdul Aziz | MoH/FSTS |
| 78 | Ibrahim Al Bashier Ahmed | SRA |
| 79 | Aisha Hussein Hassan | FSTS/MoAF |
| 80 | Khaldah Ibrahim Ahmed | NCf Population |
| 81 | Salwa Yousif Shalwani | MoA/Inter'l Coop./FSTS |
| | | |
| | National Assembly | |
| 82 | Hussein Mohammed Humdi | MP and Deputy Chair of Agriculture Committee |
| GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN – state level | | |
| | Gedarif | |
| 83 | Dr. Mohammed Osman Mohammed Nur | DG, MoAF |
| 84 | Mustafa Mohammed Osman | Planning Dept, MoAF |
| 85 | Youssif Mohammed Abdel Latief | Planning Dept, MoAR |
| 86 | Um AL Hussein Al Tayeb | Planning, MOAF |
| 87 | Afaf Omer Abdul Hafiz | MoH and Nutrition |
| 88 | Abdul Gadir Abdel Muniem Mohammed | Planning Dept/MoAF |
| | Kassala | |
| 89 | Abdul Hakeem Ahmed Al Hassan | DG, MoAF |
| 90 | Abdul Gadir Al Haj Ali Khalid | Director of Planning Dept, MoAF |
| 91 | Al Ga'ali Ibrahim Omer | Technology Transfer, MoAF |
| 92 | Hamza Osman Mohammed | Plant Protection, MoAF |
| 93 | Aisha Mohammed Dein | Land Use Dept, MoAF |
| 94 | Alawia Atta | Tech. Transfer, MoAF |
| 95 | Samira Hassan Mohammed | Horticultural Department, MoAF |
| 96 | Eshraqa Abdul Rahman | Nutrition, MoH |
| 97 | Khadiga Hassan | Nutrition, MoH |
| 98 | Director of Planning | MoARF |
| 99 | Ahmed Lummumba | WFP |

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| INDEPENDENT | | |
| | Partners In Development | |
| 100 | Dr. Omer Abdullah Egemi | Consultant |
| 101 | Dr. Ahmed Mohammed Malik Abu Sin | Consultant |
| 102 | Dr. Abdul Latief Ahmed Egemi | Former U. Secretary/MoAF, consultant |
| | | |
| 103 | Mary Hall | EC reviewer |
| | | |
| DONORS & MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS | | |
| 104 | Daniel Gonzalez | EU |
| 105 | ECHO officer | ECHO |
| 106 | Simon Narbeth | DFID, Social Protection Adviser |
| 107 | Juliette Prodhon | DFID, Humanitarian Adviser |
| 108 | Barbara Reed | USAID, Food for Peace |
| 109 | Eissa Adam | CIDA |
| 110 | Emma Pacios Fernandez | Spanish Development |
| 111 | Mohammed Osman Hussein | World Bank |
| | | |
| OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS | | |
| 112 | Mohamed Al Hafiz Ibrahim | FEWSNET, USAID |
| 113 | Abdel Rahim Norein | FEWSNET, USAID |
| | | |
| UN AGENCIES | | |
| | FAO | |
| 114 | Mai Moussa Abari | FAO Representative |
| 115 | Salah El Dien Muddathir Ahmed | FAO |
| 116 | Emanuel Luojo | ERCU |
| 117 | Jimmy | FAO |
| 118 | ZAO | FAO |
| 119 | Younis Berkley | FAO/Kadugli |
| 120 | Anton Caesar | FAO |
| 121 | Dr. Mohammed El Tahir Haroun | FAO/ Kassala |
| 122 | Charles Agobia | CTA, SPCR |
| 123 | Carsten Haub | EFTAS Ferenerkundung Technologietransfer GmbH GMFS |
| 124 | Hassan Elsheikh | National Consultant Coordinator for GMFS activities in Sudan |
| 125 | Mauro Evangelisti | FAO-RFE consultant to SIFSIA-N |
| 126 | Stefano Alessandrini | FAO-RFE consultant to SIFSIA-N |
| | WFP | |
| 127 | Bakri Osman | WFP/ VAM |
| | UNDP | |
| 128 | Massimo Halti | CTA, CRMA |
| 129 | Meer Ibrahim | UNDP |
| | IFAD | |
| 130 | Mohamed Abdulgadir | Country Representative |
| | | |

| NGOs | | |
|------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | NGOs – Khartoum | |
| 131 | Khartoum-based staff | Practical Action |
| 132 | Khartoum-based staff | GOAL |
| 133 | Khartoum-based staff | Islamic Relief Worldwide |
| | | |
| | NGOs – Kassala | |
| 134 | Jamal Mohammed Al Ameen | GOAL/Kassala |
| 135 | Musa Abdul Gadir | German Agro Action/Kassala |
| 136 | Mustafa Mohammed Al Hassan | Accord/Kassala |
| | | |

Annex 4. Schedule of the SIFSIA-N Final Evaluation Team

18 October 2011

Evaluation team leader in Rome for briefing with OED, TCE, ESA, ESS and NRL

6 November 2011

Joint team meeting in Addis Ababa of SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S evaluation teams

7 November 2011

Team leader arrives in Khartoum

8 November 2011

PSU briefing and first meeting with the evaluation team

9 to 10 November 2011

Interviews with international stakeholders of SIFSIA-N stakeholders in Khartoum

11 to 14 November 2011

Field visit to Kassala and Gedaref States

15 November 2011

Programme SC meeting, Khartoum – evaluation briefing

16 November 2011

IT/ systems analyst team member arrives in Khartoum

15 to 23 November 2011

Interviews with principal national and international SIFSIA-N stakeholders in Khartoum

24 November 2011

am Debriefing to programme SC, Khartoum

pm Debriefing to FAO-R

25 November 2011

am debriefing with EU Delegation Khartoum, and videoconference with SIFSIA-S evaluation team

26 November 2011

Joint team meeting in Addis Ababa of SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S evaluation teams

19 December 2011

Debriefing in FAO Rome by evaluation team leader

Annex 5. Common Information, Communication & Training Issues and Lessons Learned

| Issue | Implications | Examples from SIFSIA – North |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| Information Policy | Mandate to collect and maintain data | New data collection may be outside a Ministry mandate – limiting system uptake and support for data collection |
| | Data access policies – cost recovery, commercial or open data policies. | SMA/FNC: different agencies will have different data distribution / confidentiality policies for data. |
| Hardware | Long delays in installation of hardware | GIEWS Workstation |
| | Reliance on outside maintenance | Faults may take long time to resolve |
| Software | Simplicity vs complexity | Stress simplicity and maintainability of systems over comprehensiveness – better to do a simple job well. |
| | Expensive and not widely available for distribution down to state levels | GIS software, ArcGIS |
| | Delays in installation | FAMIS /GIEWS WS |
| | Incomplete or elements that may not meet initially perceived requirements | GIEWS Workstation GeoNetwork FAMIS Esook implementation - |
| | Delays in application development | FAMIS / Nutrition Information System. |
| | Licences – update of licences procured by SIFSIA – to current versions and full applications | GIS software versions and advanced applications to support spatial analysis and geostatistics. |
| | Software development – development by nationals or transfer to national suppliers within the programme. | E.g. FAMIS/FARMER |
| | | |
| Communications | Internet connectivity | Slow internet connectivity impact on data submission. |
| | Internet hosting – positive model for resolving communication and hosting capacity for distributed systems | Server concentration in the National Information Centre (NIC) / proposed at the FNC and SMA / FAO RFE |
| | Product awareness and distribution | FAMIS / NIS / NRM – only just being disseminated towards the end of the project |
| | Multi-lingual systems | Need for Arabic and English systems |
| | Culture of email access | May not be a culture of using email |
| | Website – as a tool for monitoring - can provide useful performance and impact data | Not envisaged as an indicator. Delay in launch of FSTS website to replace FAO host. |
| Training and installation mismatch | Appropriate level training and awareness raising – ICT literacy and timing of training in relation to software / infrastructure installation | State level training, GIEWS WS. |
| | eLearning materials and video as effective ways of enhancing and | e.g. FS e-learning training, FAMIS video, proposed Land Cover video. |

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| | reinforcing training and enhancing awareness and promotion | NIS and learning development |
| | General IT training | Should this be a procured local service or develop an effective institutional capacity (e.g. within college / university) |
| Staffing | Turnover / Loss of staff and loss of skill sets as people move on. | Risk in all areas of capacity development |
| | Use of volunteer labour - positive financially but risk to completion and continuity | NIS / ToKTEN volunteer |
| Information quality | Standardisation | Lack of standardisation of IPC contributory data |
| | Capture quality and quality assurance | Some concerns over the rigour of the procedures for QA of data. |
| Exit strategy | Maintenance issues: hardware and software / licensing | Handover of licences and maintenance |
| | Training manuals / ToT | Need to have mutli-lingual / Arabic manuals. e.g. FAMIS good handover procedures. |
| | Website consolidation and on-going support | Transfer to a website that is managed and maintained and updated. Single rather than multiple sites, or additional microsites vs distributed linked sites under a Food Security Sudan portal |